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SECTION A

CASE LAW UPDATE - 2001
THE TOP 10 CASES THAT WILL CHANGE YOUR PRACTICE
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Professor Rogers:
United States v. Mead Corporation A-I
II. CIVIL RIGHTS & FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Professor Schwemm:
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing A-3
m. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Professor Fortune:
Dickerson v. United States A-6
B. Professor Welling:
Apprendi v. New Jersey A-8
c. Professor Connelly:
Kyllo v. United States A-II
IV. EMPLOYMENT I LABOR
A. Professor Goldman:
Circuit City Stores v. Adams A-I3
v. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Professor Bratt:
Romer v. Evans A-I6
SECTION A
VI. FAMILY LAW
A. Professor Graham:
Troxel v. Granville A-19
VII. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
A. Professor Healy:
Friends of the Earth, Inc., et al v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc. . A-21
VID. RELIGION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Professor Salamanca:
Mitchell v. Helms A-22
SECTION A
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. United States v. Mead Corporation, __ U.S. __' 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001)
(Professor Rogers' pick) (8-1; Justice Souter with Scalia dissenting).
1. FACTS: The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of U.S. (HTSUS) permits
the U.S. Customs Service, through its headquarters or anyone of its
46 point of entry offices, "to classify and fix the rate of duty on
imports, under rules and regulations issued by the [Treasury
Secretary]." kL. at 2166. One regulation authorizes the Custom
Service and all its offices to issue "ruling letters" that set the tariff
classification for certain imports. Such letters apply only to the
specific case before Customs. The "letters" are not subject to notice
and comment before being issued, and may be modified or revoked
without notice.
Relying on a letter ruling, Mead Corporation imported spiral-bound
day planners and three-ring appointment, phone and calendar binders
duty free. However, in 1993, Customs changed its mind and issued
a ruling letter classifying Mead's day planners as "bound" "diaries"
subject to a four percent tariff.
2. LOWER COURTS: Mead filed suit and lost in the Court of
International Trade, but prevailed before the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Federal Circuit Court held that unlike Customs
regulations, ruling letters should not receive the highest level of
deference, accorded under Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court gave no
deference to the ruling letter because it was not preceded by notice
and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.
3. ISSUE AND HOLDING: Going beyond the tariff issue to address
when courts should defer to agency decisions, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to consider the limits of Uudicial] deference owed
to administrative practice in applying a statute." kL. at 2171.
a. The Court held that "administrative implementation of a
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
[when a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a
statute it administers] when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority." kL.
A-I
b. "When Congress has 'explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. It, ld.:.,
citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 843-44.
c. Contrast this with the Chevron Doctrine which created a two
part test to determine judicial deference: first, whether
Congress' intent was clear, and if so, the court and the agency
must defer; and second, if Congress' intent is ambiguous, the
court should give deference to the agency's interpretation if it
is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844.
d. More specifically, the Court held the "letter rulings" were not
entitled to Chevron style deference because the statute gave
no indication that Congress intended to delegate authority to
Customs to bind third parties by issuing letter rulings that
carried the "force of law."
e. Nevertheless, the Court held that some deference is due these
less formal agency actions under the doctrine announced in
Skidmore v. Swift & Company, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
f. Skidmore held that an agency's interpretation may merit some
[intermediate] deference based on the consideration of such
factors as its "power to persuade" based on the "writer's
thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with prior
interpretations, and any other sources of weight such as" the
complexity of the regulatory scheme, the specialized expertise
of the agency and, "the value of uniformity in its administrative
and judicial understandings of what a national law requires."
ld.:. at 2172 and 2175, quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. 140.
1. The "letter rulings" "are best treated like 'interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines." ld.:. at 2175. As such, the
letter rulings are entitled to some deference under
Skidmore v. Swift & Company, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
g. Mead also sanctioned an expansion in the application of the
Chevron doctrine by noting such deference isn't limited to
notice and comment rulemaking but may be established in a
variety of ways.
4. SIGNIFICANCE: The lone dissenter, Justice Scalia characterized this
case as "one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the
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Court dealing with judicial review of administrative action. Its
consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad." .u1. at
2189.
a. Scalia argues that Mead, which restricts agency deference,
and employs "th'ol' totality of the circumstances test" replaces
the predictable and clear Chevron Doctrine. .u1. at 2178.
i. "What was previously a general presumption of
authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes
they have been authorized to enforce has been
changed to a presumption of no such authority, which
must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the
contrary." .u1. at 2178.
ii. "And whereas previously, when agency authority to
resolve ambiguity did not exist the court was free to give
the statute what it considered the best interpretation,
henceforth the court must supposedly give the agency
view some indeterminate amount ofso-called Skidmore
deference." lit
b. Scalia predicted that the practical effects of Mead would be:
"protracted confusion" because the Mead test is "wonderfully
imprecise",Id. at 2181 ; "artificially induced increase in informal
rulemaking" to obtain Chevron deference, .u1. ;"the ossification
of large portions of our statutory law" because "once the court
has spoken, it becomes unlawful for the agency to take a
contradictory position, lit at 2181-2182; and, the Mead
Doctrine "compounds the confusion it creates by breathing
new life into the anachronism of Skidmore. . .[which is
essentially] "a trifling statement of the obvious: Ajudge should
take into account the well-considered views of expert
observers." .u1. at 2183.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS & FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (Professor Schwemm's
pick) ( 9-0; O'Conner for a unanimous Court)
1. FACTS: After forty years with Sanderson Plumbing, a toilet seat and
cover manufacturer, Roger Reeves, age 57 and co-worker Russell
Caldwell, age 45, were terminated. After a three month audit, the
Company said Reeves and Caldwell had failed to keep accurate time
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and attendance records of the employees they supervised. Reeves
had also been placed on probation for similar reasons two years
earlier.
Reeves filed suit in federal court claiming a violation of the Age
Discrimination EmploymentAct (ADEA). Allegedly Reeves' boss had
made two discriminatory statements several months before Reeves
dismissal. They were: that Reeves "must have come over on the
Mayflower"; and that he was "too damn old to do his job." Sanderson
said Reeves was terminated for poor work performance, i.e., a 1993
probation and the 1995 audit.
Reeves countered with evidence that he had accurately recorded the
time and attendance of the employees under his supervision and any
errors were the fault of the company's automated time card system.
The court overruled Sanderson's two motions for judgments as a
matter of law and the jury awarded Reeves $35,000. However, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Reeves had failed to introduce sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude his termination resulted from age-
based discrimination.
2. ISSUE: The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie
case of discrimination..., combined with sufficient evidence for a
reasonable fact finder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability
for intentional discrimination." kL. at 141.
3. HOLDING: In addressing the eVidentiary· burdens required of a
plaintiff in an ADEA case, a plaintiff's prima facie case of
discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable
fact-finder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for
its decision, may, in some cases, permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated. kL. at 147-148
8. The Court added that "this is not to say that such 8 showing by
the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding
of liability. kL.
b. In Reeves, the Court clarifies the third stage of the McDonnell
Douglas v.Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Burdine v. Texas
Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), three-
part test.
i. First, the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of
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the evidence, a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. This creates a .presumption of unlawful
discrimination by the employer. If the employer doesn't
rebut this evidence, and the jury believes the plaintiff,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because
there is no remaining issue of fact. Burdine, at 254.
ii. The defendant must respond to the plaintiffs evidence
by producing some evidence or a legitimate reason that
its action was nondiscriminatory. kL. at 254-255.
iii. Then, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to
persuade the finder of fact that the employerterminated
him for a discriminatory purpose by direct or indirect
evidence. kL.
4. As to the burden of proof required, the Court acknowledged that
ADEA cases rely on circumstantial evidence a great deal to prove
discrimination. As such the Court held:
a. U[R]ejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff
. . . it is permissible forthe trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact
of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation
...Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination." Reeves, at 146-147.
b. uln appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
5. Under this analysis, the Court determined that Reeves successfully
rebutted Sanderson's defense that Reeves had not been keeping
accurate time and attendance records. Indeed, Reeves met his
burden that proving Sanderson's reasons were pretextual because
Sanderson conceded these facts under cross-examination. kL.
6. In Part II, the Court clarified the trial court's standard for granting a
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
a. Under Rule 50, a court should render a judgment as a matter
of law when ua party has been fully head on an issue and there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
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find for that party on that issue." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50 (a).
b. "[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence...Thus, although the
court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the Jury is not
required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to
the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and
unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes
from disinterested witnesses." kl at 150.
7. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Schwemm says,.Reeves "deals with what
type of evidence is sufficient for a plaintiff in a discrimination case to
get to a jury on the "pretext" issue after the defendant has come up
with a "legitimate" reason for its action against the plaintiff. This is
where most of the fight is in discrimination cases, since defendants
always come up with a "legitimate" reason, and the plaintiff must then
try to show that this is a "pretext" for the defendant's real motivation
(Le., discrimination).
a. Under Reeves, it will be easier for a plaintiff to reach the jury.
Simply cross-examining the defendant's witnesses, without
additional affirmative evidence, may produce sufficient
evidence.
b. Reeves may reduce the success rates of summary judgment
motions and motions for judgments as a matter of law.
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Professor Fortune's
pick) (7-2; Rehnquist; Scalia .and Thomas dissenting)
1. FACTS: Dickerson was arrested for bank robbery after his
license plate was spotted as he drove away from the bank.
Ten F.B.1. agents came to his apartment, so he "voluntarily"
accompanied them to the station. He was interrogated but no
Miranda warnings were given. Agents then told Dickerson they
had obtained a search warrant for his apartment so he made
an incriminating statement and alsoi~plicated another in the
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commission of the robbery. His lawyer made a motion to
suppress the statement as a violation of Miranda, and the court
granted the motion. The U.S. Government appealed solely on
the issue of whether Miranda was properly applied.
2. CONTEXT &PROCEDURE: In 1968, shortly after the Miranda
decision, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501 which stated that
confessions should be admissible in federal court if they are
voluntary, even if Miranda warnings are not properly given. In
determining voluntariness, the court must consider the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including five
specified, but non-controlling, factors. The giving of the
warnings was merely one of the factors the court had to
consider.
a. Since the passage of § 3501, The Justice Department
has refused to invoke the law believing it to be
unconstitutional. However, two conservative public
interest groups filed amicus b~iefs in the Fourth Circuit
arguing that the Court should apply § 3501 sua sponte,
and admit the confession.
b. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Dickerson had not
received his Miranda warnings, but found that pursuant
to § 3501, the confession was voluntary. The court
then concluded that since Miranda was not a
constitutional holding but merely an exercise of the
Court's supervisory authority to regulate evidence and
procedure, Congress could legislatively overrule
Miranda. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667
(1999). The Court granted certiorari.
3. HOLDING: Finding § 3501 to be unconstitutional, the Court
held that "Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court,
may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we
decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that
Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility
of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state
and federal courts." kl at 432.
a. Court "concede[s] that there is language in some of
[their] opinions to support [the] view" that Miranda is not
a constitutional rule. Indeed, the Court on several
occasions referred to the warnings as "prophylactic"
"not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but
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[are] instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination is protected." Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306 (1985).
b. Nevertheless, the Court held Miranda was a
constitutional decision for a couple of reasons:
i. Miranda and its companion cases had applied to
state court proceedings and petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. kh at 438-439.
ii. The Court also invited "legislative action to
protect the constitutional right against coerced
self-incrimination." kh at 440.
c. Court also recognized that "the principles of stare
decisis weigh heavily against overruling [Miranda] now."
kh at 443. "Miranda has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture." kh
3. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Fortune says, "clearly, the most
significant Criminal Procedure case in the last two years is the
one that didn't change the law-that is Dickerson. v. United
States, which enshrined (is that too strong a word?) Miranda.
Dickerson is interesting forthe [majority] lineup, for Rehnquist's
respect for stare decisis, for the rather unconvincing
distinguishing of cases such as Elstad, and for the way in
which the case arose. Fascinating case."
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Professor Welling's pick) (5-4;
Stevens; Scalia and Thomas each filed concurring opinions while O'Conner,
Rehnquist , Kennedy and Breyer dissented)
1. FACTS: Apprendi was charged with several firearms offenses,
committed on four different dates, for shooting several shots into an
African-American family's home. The family had just recently moved
into Apprendi's all white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey. None
of the counts alleged that Apprendi had acted with a racially biased
purpose. Apprendi entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts
of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose which was
punishable by five to ten years imprisonment. However, the
prosecutor sought to enhance his sentence based on New Jersey's
"hate crime" statute.
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a. The statute provides for "an extended term of imprisonment if
the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant in committing the crime acted with the purpose
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity." kt. at 468-469, quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. Section
2C:39-4(a).
b. Apprendi's was facing an enhanced sentence of imprisonment
of "between 10 and 20 years." kt.
c. Apprendi challenged the enhancement, pursuant to the
conditional plea, and presented evidence including his own
testimony and the testimony of character witnesses to
contradict the state's claim that he had shot into the house
because the occupants were black.
d. The trial court found by a "preponderance of the evidence" that
Apprendi's actions were racially motivated and enhanced his
sentence to 12 years. Apprendi appealed arguing he had
been denied his right to a jury determination beyond a
reasonable doubt on each element of the offense.
2. The Court narrowly framed the question before it as, "whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the
basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." kt.
3. HOLDING: The New Jersey statute is unconstitutional. Quoting
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6, (which struck down
a federal statute) the Court held that "under the Due Process Clause
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." kt. at 476.
a. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." kt. at 490.
b. The Court noted that "[t]he relevant inquiry is not one of form,
but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant
A-9
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the Jury's guilty
verdict?" kL. at 494.
c. The Court's rationale was based on a review of the historical
practice of American and English courts and precedent.
4. CONCURRENCES: In separate opinions, Justices Scalia and
Thomas both concurred with the majority's opinion in full, but argued
the Constitution requires the adoption of an even broader rule.
Thomas wrote, "A 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis for
imposing or increasing punishment...of whatever sort, including the
fact of a prior conviction..." kL. at 501.
5. DISSENTS: In four separate opinions, the dissenters agreed that
Apprendi will be remembered as a "watershed change in
constitutional law." kL. at 523. O'Conner noted "the serious doubt
that the holding cast[s] on sentencing systems employed by the
Federal Government and States alike, [Le., .determinate sentencing
through the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.]" kL. O'Conner argues that
by establishing a bright line constitutional rule that juries alone must
determine the facts that increase the penalty, the majority implicitly
overrules an entire line of cases underpinning a legislative
determination of sentencing factors. Id. at 524-525.
a. However, the majority opinion makes clear that Apprendi's
holding is much narrower: only those facts that increase the
maximum penalty range are "elements of a crime" so that
Guidelines should not be affected if the judge imposes a
sentence within the penalty range.
6. SIGNIFICANCE: As Professor Welling points out "about 30% of the
federal criminal caseload is drug prosecutions and most have been
affected by ApprendL" Like the dissenters noted, the opinion may be
"unworkable" because of all the factors that should be considered at
sentencing; that it will be very costly to many states who will have to
create bifurcated jury systems; and, that "the rule rests on a
meaningless formalism" that is easily circumvented by a legislature
who simply raises the statutory penalty range. kL. at 539.
a. Note KRS 532.031, Kentucky's hate crime statute, allows the
sentencing judge to determine, "if, by a preponderance of the
evidence presented at the trial, a hate crime was the primary
factor in the commission of the crime,[then] the judge shall
make a written finding of fact and enter that in the court record
A-I0
and in the judgment...The finding...may be utilized by the
sentencing judge as the sole factor for denial of probation,
shock probation, conditional discharge, or other form of
nonimpositon ofa sentence of incarceration."
b. The finding can also be used by the parole board. KRS
532.031(4).
C. Kyllo v. United States, _U.S. _, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) (Professor
Connelly's pick, in hindsight) (5-4 decision; Scalia; Stevens, Rehnquist,
O'Conner and Kennedy dissenting)
1. FACTS: Government agents "suspected" Kyllo was growing
marijuana in his home, "which was part of a triplex." kl at 2041.
Using a thermal imaging device, the agents wanted to determine
whether the amount of heat coming from Kyllo's home was consistent
with the use of high density lamps necessary for a successful in-home
marijuana growing operation.
The agents used the thermal imager from their car which was parked
across the street from Kyllo's house. The device showed much
higher amounts of heat coming from the garage roof and from a side
wall of Kyllo's home as compared to the rest of the homes in the
triplex.
Based on the Kyllo's utility bills, informants tips and the thermal scans
the agents obtained a search warrant for Kyllo's house. When the
warrant was executed, the agents found Kyllo was growing more than
100 marijuana plants using high intensity lamps. Kyllo was charged
with the manufacture of marijuana and after his motion to suppress
was denied, he entered a conditional guilty plea.
2. ISSUE: "This case presents the question whether the use of a
thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street
to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." kl at 2040.
a. In other words, "what limits, if any, exist upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." kl
3. HOLDING: "Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and presumptively unreasonable without a
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warrant." kl at 2046. As such, "the information obtained by the
thermal imager...was the product of a search." kl at 2043.
a. Scalia noted that "the advance of technology. . .[has]
uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once
were private," [but the Court has never determined] how much
technological enhancement of ordinary perception... is too
much." kl at 2042.
i. He focused on the sanctity of the home stating, "[a]t the
very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of
a man to retreat into his home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." kl
b. He establishes a bright-line rule that "assures preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted" while taking into account
technology "already in use or in development." kl at 2043.
c. Scalia rejects the dissent's and government's argument that
"the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected 'only
heat radiating from the external surface of the house,''', and
thus was in the public domain. kl 2044. Noting the Court
rejected this "mechanical interpretation... in Katz, where the
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth." kl
i. "Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner
at the mercy of advancing technology-including
imaging technology that could discern all human activity
in the home." kl
ii. Also rejected the argument that the imager did not
reveal any "intimate details." Scalia stated, "in the
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes." kl at 2045.
4. SIGNIFICANCE: First, look at the improbable roster of the majority:
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer
Second, this is the first case to deal with high-tech surveillance since
the Court's 1986 decision in Dow Chemical v. United States 476 U.S.
227 (1986) which upheld the taking of enhanced aerial photographs
of Dow Chemical Company. In Kyllo, the Court distinguished Dow
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based on the difference under the Fourth Amendment between a
commercial establishment and a home. .llt.
a. Given the recent terrorist attacks, this case is interesting for
the breadth of the rule established, which I believe will now be
read very narrowly. The majority wanted the opinion to "take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in
development."ld. 2042.
b. The holding that the use of a thermal imager constitutes a
search, applies to all "sense-enhancing technology" which is
"not in general public use" to collect "information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area. .llt. at 2043.
i. What does "sense-enhancing technology" encompass?
What does "general public use" mean? What does
information that would be "unknowable absent physical
intrusion mean"?
IV. EMPLOYMENT I LABOR
A. Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001)
(Professor Goldman's pick) (5-4; Kennedy with Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer dissenting)
1. FACTS: In October, 1995, Adams applied for a job with Circuit City.
He signed an application which stated: "I agree that I will settle any
and all previously unasserted claims, disputes, or controversies
arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with
Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a
neutral Arbitrator." .llt. at 1306.
Adams was hired by Circuit City as a "sales counselor." However, two
years later, Adams sued Circuit City in state court for employment
discrimination alleging that he had been harassed for being gay. He
also raised tort and contract claims.
Circuit City responded by filing suit in federal court to enjoin the state
action and to compel Adams to resolve his claims through arbitration
as required by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and his signed
application.
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2. ISSUE: The FAA specifically excludes from coverage "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employers, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1.
All circuits but the Ninth Circuit interpret this provision as "exempting
contracts of employment of transportation workers, but not other
employment contracts, from the FAA's coverage." ~ The Ninth
Circuit holds that all employment contracts are beyond the FAA's
reach. The Court decided which interpretation was correct.
a. Adams asserted that all employment contracts were excluded
from the FAA.
b. Circuit City maintained that the exclusion should be limited to
workers "actually engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce."
c. The attorneys general of 22 states filed amicus briefs urging
the Court against applying the FAA to employment contracts.
They argued that the FAA's requirement of arbitration ran
contrary to state laws which protect employees from any
restriction of their right to pursue state discrimination claims in
state court.
3. HOLDING: "§ 1 of the FAA which states that the Act shall not apply
"to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,"
"exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of
transportation workers." ~ at 1311.
a. In short, Arbitration clauses in employment contracts are
enforceable under the FAA except for seamen, railroad
employees, and other transportation employees.
b. Using rules of statutory construction, the Court reasoned, if the
phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce"was intended to apply to all employees,
there would be no reason to specifically list "seamen" and
"railroad employees" in the statute. As such, the general
phrase had to construed as applying only to occupations that
were similar to the ones specifically listed.
c. The Court also reaffirmed its views supporting the use of
arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes.
Justice Kennedy wrote:
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i. "We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that
the advantages of the arbitration process somehow
disappearwhen transferred to the employment context.
Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs
of litigation, a benefit that· may be of particular
importance in employment litigation, which often
involves smaller sums of· money than disputes
concerning commercial contracts." !!!:. at 1313.
ii. Arbitration also avoids knotty choice-ot-Iaw questions
and the bifurcation ot proceedings in cases where state
law precludes arbitration of some, but not all,
employment claims. !!!:.
d. The Court expressly declined to address whether the FAA pre-
empted state arbitration provisions since the issue was not
before it.
e. Still stinging from Bush v.Gore, the dissent, which was
composed of the same four justices, not only argued that the
FAA only applied to commercial contracts, but added, "[w]hen
the Court simply ignores the interest of the unrepresented
employee, it skews its interpretation with its own policy
preferences." !!!:. at 1318.
4. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Goldman says, "In the next few years it is
anticipated that arbitration provisions will become boilerplate in job
applications, employee handbooks or simply as a separate document
that must be signed to keep your job, since it generally is assumed
that those selected to arbitrate such cases will be far less generous
than juries in awarding damages in disputes such as those arising
under the various civil rights laws and other worker protective
legislation."
r
f
i
L_
a.
b.
"The rationale of the majority opinion would extend employer
imposed arbitration to all such employee claims. As such, it is
also unclear, at this point in time, whether the Court will also
enforce "employment contract" arbitration provisions to resolve
such statutory disputes as those involving overtime pay, Plant
Closing Act damages claims, Family Medical Leave Act claims,
etc."
"This means that there will be a need to develop a whole new
cadre of arbitrators for such cases and that general
practitioners as well as specialists will be spending a lot more
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time practicing before these private tribunals without the
normal discovery tools, and with a lot more uncertainty
concerning such matters as the evidentiary rules, standard of
judicial review, scope of potential remedies, and the
responsibility for paying the cost of the private tribunal."
c. Note that the Court has accepted certiorari in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, No.
99-1823. The issue is whether an employee's agreement to
submit to workplace disputes, including discrimination claims,
to arbitration prevents the EEOC from intervening. If the
EEOC loses, by including an arbitration clause, employers can
effectively protect themselves from the EEOC. The EEOC
would suffer a great loss of influence.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Professor Bratt's No.1 pick) (6-3
Kennedy; Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas dissenting)
1. FACTS: In a statewide referendum, Colorado voters adopted a
constitutional amendment (Amendment 2) which read:
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis ofor entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination."
2. Evans anp other "homosexual persons" including some governmental
employees brought suit alleging "the enforcement of Amendment 2
would subject them to immediate and substantial risk ofdiscrimination
on the basis of their sexual orientation." 19.:. at 625. Some
municipalities who had passed ordinances to protect gays and
lesbians from discrimination but were forbidden to do so by
Amendment 2 [also sued]. 19.:.
3. The Colorado Supreme Court held "Amendment 2 was subject to
strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed
the [newly created] fundamental right of gays and lesbians to
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participate in the political process." kl (citations omitted). The Court
then held that none of the state's asserted interests withstood strict
scrutiny because the Amendment was not narrowly tailored to serve
any compelling g'overnmental interest.
4. HELD: The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Colorado Supreme Court holding it violated the Equal Protection
Clause but on different grounds, i.e., using the lowest standard of
equal protection scrutiny, the rational basis test. kl at 631.
a. First, the Court rejected the State's argument that the
Amendment only "puts gays and lesbians in the same position
as all other persons...[and so] does no more than deny
homosexuals special rights." kl at 626. Such "special rights"
are the "safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint." As such, "2" imposes "a special disability upon
[gays] alone." kl at 631.
i. Court adopted the Colorado Supreme Court's
construction that the "immediate objective" of
Amendment 2 is to repeal exi"sting anti-discrimination
laws and policies prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Id.
ii. Amendment also prevents the government from
adopting "similar, or more protective" laws or policies in
the future. kl at 627.
iii. Consequently, Amendment 2 results in a "[s]weeping
and comprehensive. . .change in the legal status "of
homosexuals because they are put "in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both the
private and governmental spheres." ld.:.
b. In discussing the rational basis test, the Court noted that "if a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate [state] end.
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies even this conventional
inquiry." kl at 631 (citations omitted).
c. The Court concluded Amendment 2 failed the rational basis
test and so violated the Equal Protection Clause on two distinct
grounds.
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i. "First, the amendment. . .impos[es] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group...
[which] is an invalid form of legislation." M:. at 632.
1. Amendment 2 "is at once too narrow and too
broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and
then denies them protection across the board.
The resulting disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection
from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence." M:. at 633.
2. "[G]overnment and each of its parts [must]
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek
its assistance. . . A law declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection."
M:.
ii. Second, [t]he breadth of the amendment is so far
removed from [the state's] particular justifications that
we find it impossible to credit .them. .. It is a status-
based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests; it is a classification of persons
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection Clause does not permit." M:. at 635.
1. The Court appears to say that the state's
asserted interests, Le., freedom of association,
Le., specifically landlords and employers who
object to homosexuality on religious or personal
grounds and "conserving state resources to fight
discrimination against other groups" are simply
pretexts. Indeed, the amendment "raisers] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected which isn't a rational basis for
the law. M:. at 634.
d. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Bratt says this is a landmark case
for several reasons.
i. It is the first case to grant constitutional protection to
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individuals on the basis of sexual orientation." By
striking a state constitutional amendment using the
most deferential test, Romer represents and
emphasizes Equal Protection Clause principles: that
states must extend the protection of their laws to all
people who claim injury and seek a remedy; and that
animosity toward or social condemnation of a class with
a shared characteristic cannot constitute a permissible
governmental purpose.
1. However, see Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati. Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 365
(1998) ( memo opinion by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, J.J.).
VI. FAMILY LAW
A. Troxel V. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Professor Graham really wouldn't
pick this case, but didn't want to disappoint you)(O'Conner writing for the
four-justice plurality of Rehnquist, Ginsberg and Breyer; Souter and Thomas
concurred in the result and Scalia and Kennedy wrote separate dissents)
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FACTS: Although unmarried, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel had
a long relationship that produced two daughters. When Brad and
Tommie separated, Brad who lived with his parents, regularly brought
his daughters to his parents home on the weekends for a visit.
However, in 1993 Brad committed suicide. The Troxel's continued to
see their grandchildren on a regular basis until Tommie Granville
informed them that she was limiting the children's visits to one short
visit a month. The Troxel's petitioned for visitation under
Washington's third-party visitation statute. The trial court granted the
petition, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed declaring the
statute to be unconstitutional.
THE STATUTE: "Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of
Washington permits 'any person' to petition a superior court for
visitation rights 'at any time' whenever 'visitation may serve the best
interest of the child.'" 12:. at 59.
ISSUE: "[W]hether Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Tommie
Granville and her family violated the Federal Constitution." 12:. at 63.
A-19
4. HOLDING: Citing a long list of decisions, the Court said, "it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."
!d.:. at 66. The Washington third party visitation statute, "as applied
to Granville and her family in this case, unconstitutionally infringes on
that fundamental parental right." !d.:. at 67.
a. O'Conner found the "nonparental visitation statute" to be
"breathtakingly broad." !d.:. The statute provided that "[a]ny
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time.
That language effectively permits any third party seeking
visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning
visitation of the parent's children to state-court review." kL.
b. Moreover, once the visitation petition is filed, "a parent's
decision that visitation would not be in the child's best interest
is accorded no deference... any presumption of validity or any
weight whatsoever." !d.:.
c. The Court did not consider the "primary constitutional question
passed on by the Washington Supreme Court- whether the
Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes
to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as
a condition prece.dent to granting visitation." !d.:. at 73
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5. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Graham says aside from the fact six
members of the Court had problems with the statute, the Court simply
found the statute unconstitutional as applied. The practical lesson to
be drawn from the case is that grandparents will face a bigger burden
in trying to obtain more visitation. Under Troxel, a court must start
with the presumption that the parents' decision regarding visitation is
in the child's best interests. In order to override s parent's decision
to decrease, but not eliminate, grandparent visitation, the grandparent
will probably have to prove some physical or psychological harm to
the child.
s. More significant is KRS 403.340, the custody modification
statute, which does not contain a presumption favoring the
original custodian.
b. Of more concern is KRS 61.690(2) which states: "A retirement
allowance, a disability allowance, a member's accumulated
contributions, or any other benefit under the [Kentucky
Employees. Retirement] system shall not be classified as
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marital property or as an economic circumstance as provided
in KRS 403.190 in an action for dissolution of marriage."
VII. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
A. Friends of the Earth, Inc., et at., v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (2000) (Professor Healy's selection) (7-2; Ginsburg with Scalia and
Thomas dissenting)
1. FACTS: Laidlaw Environmental Services, who had obtained a permit
to discharge treated water into the North Tyger River in South
Carolina, had started to discharge pollutants, particularly mercury, into
the water. These discharges repeatedly exceeded the limits set by
the permit. Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental
Action Network (referred to collectively FOE, along with the Sierra
Club which joined the suit later) filed a citizen suit, after proper notice,
against Laidlaw under the Clean Water Act. FOE alleged Laidlaw
was not complying with the state's permit. FOE sought declaratory
and injunctive relief. During the course of the suit, Laidlaw's violations
continued, and the company was cited for 13 monitoring and 10
reporting violations.
Laidlaw moved for summary judgment on the ground the FOE lacked
Article III standing to bring the suit because they had not
demonstrated a cognizable injury in fact. In response, the FOl=
submitted members' affidavits and depositions that expressed their
fears that the river looked and smelled polluted, that they were afraid
of the river's harmful effects, and that they used the river less otten.
kl at 181.
The District Court overruled the summary" judgment "by the very
slimmest of margins," and found the discharges "did not result in any
health risk or environmental harm." Nevertheless, the court concluded
Laidlaw had received an economic benefit and assessed a $405,800
civil penalty. kl at 178. The court did not order injunctive relief
because it found Laidlaw had achieved substantial compliance with
its permit. kl
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the action. The Court held that the case
had become moot when Laidlaw complied with its permit. kl 179.
2. HOLDING: "The appellate court erred in concluding that a citizen
suitor's claim for civil penalties must be dismisse~ as moot when the
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defendant, albeit after commencement of the litigation, has come into
compliance... A defendant's voluntary cessation ofallegedly unlawful
conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case. The Court of
Appeals also misperceived the remedial potential of civil penalties.
Such penalties may serve, as an alternative to an injunction to deter
future violations and thereby redress the injuries that prompted a
citizen suitor to commence litigation." Id. at173-174.
FOE had standing to bring this action. [T]he affidavits and testimony
presented by FOE...assert that Laidlaw's discharges, and the affiant
members' reasonable concerns about the effects ofthose discharges,
directly affected affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests. These submissions present dispositively more than...
mere 'general averments' and 'conclusory allegations'." ~ 183-184.
3. SIGNIFICANCE: Professor Healy says, Laidlaw will have a
tremendous impact "on private enforcement of federal law." The case
"undercuts a narrow view of the case or controversy requirement of
Article ilL" In short, in Laidlaw the Court lowers the standing
requirement for citizen suits which will allow plaintiffs to file suit under
current environmental laws. It is a win for the environment after a
string of narrow environmental standing decisions.
VIII. RELIGION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT
B. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) ( Professor Salamanca's distant 2nd
pick. His 1st pick is Bush v. Gore) (6-3; plurality opinion by Thomas with
Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy joining; O'Conner and Breyer in concurring
in the result; and, Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg in dissent)
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1. FACTS: Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement
Act of 1981 (Chapter 2) allocates federal funds to state educational
agencies which then allocates them to local educational agencies. ~
at 801-802. The local agencies, which are usually local school
districts, lend support to individual elementary and secondary schools
in the form of "library services and materials (including media
materials), assessments, references materials,' computer software
and hardware for instructional use, and other curricular materials." ~
(statutory citations omitted).
After learning that about 30% of the total Chapter 2 funds in Jefferson
Parish, Louisiana, went to private religious schools, petitioners filed
suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied, violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. ~ Thomas noted that the case had
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a "tortuous history over the next 15 years." kt. at 804.
2. HOLDING: Although no five members of the Court agreed on a single
rationale for upholding the funding program as applied to Jefferson
Parish, six justices did hold that the funding program was not a "law
respecting an establishment of religion." kt. at 808.
a. Thomas fashions a broad rule that focuses on two main
criteria: the program must be neutral, i.e., it is permissible to
send governmental aid to religious institutions, even if used for
religious purposes, if the government program is neutral; and
the government must not be involved in indoctrination.
i. Neutrality undermines establishment claims.
b. "In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise
permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar
it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now." kt. at
829.
3. SIGNIFICANCE: It sounds as if the four members of the Plurality
(and maybe O'Conner) believe school vouchers are constitutional.
"[I]f numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a
government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral
eligibility criteria, than a government cannot, or at least cannot easily,
grant special favors that might lead to a religious establishment." kt.
at 810.
a. Thomas added: "Private choice also helps guarantee neutrality
by mitigating the preference for pre-existing recipients that is
arguably inherent in any governmental aid program...and that
could lead to a program inadvertently favoring one religion or
favoring religious private schools in general over nonreligious
ones." kt.
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Case overrules two cases that would have prevented
Louisiana's religious schools from receiving the funds.
The Court has granted review of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
No. 00-1751, and two related cases which raise the question
whether a publicly funded school voucher program that can be
used for parochial school tuition violates the Establishment
Clause.
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d. Professor Salamanca adds that Mitchell "provides further
circumstantial evidence that the ground is crumbling beneath
so-called 'strict-separationist' enforcement of the
Establishment Clause. If so, other changes may follow,
including a validation by the Court of a school voucher plan."
Professor Allison Connelly
Assistant Professor
Director, U. K. Legal Clinic
630 Maxwelton Ct.
Lexington, KY 40506-0040
(859) 257-4692
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
by
Professor Robert G. Lawson
(October 26, 2001)
I. Introduction: The cases selected for discussion were decided
within the last two years (2000 and 2001). It would probably be
a stretch to call any of them "landmark" decisions but they deal
with important and interesting matters and deserve the attention
of practicing lawyers and judges. There is a mixture of state
and federal cases but even the latter provide helpful guidance to
Kentucky lawyers and judges because of the great uniformity that
exists between the Kentucky and Federal Rules and the tendency of
Kentucky's courts to rely on federal case law in applying and
construing the Kentucky Rules.
II. Demonstrative (or Real) Evidence: In this important area,
the following cases should draw some attention from practitioners
and judges:
A. Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662 (Ky. 2000): The plaintiff
Gorman was in her car on a busy highway when she saw a wallet in
the center lane; she pulled to the shoulder, left her car to get
the wallet, and was struck by defendant's vehicle as she tried to
return to her car. The principal factual issue revolved around
where the plaintiff was located when struck and whether defendant
saw her in time to stop. In support of his version of where the
plaintiff was at time of impact and what she was doing, defendant
offered into evidence (via an expert witness) "posed photographs"
purporting to show plaintiff's position relative to defendant's
vehicle prior to and at the time of the impact. The photographs
had been taken in a vacant lot, using a female stand-in for the
plaintiff and a vehicle like the one driven by the defendant; the
portrayal by the posed photographs were at odds with plaintiff's
description of events but in accord with the view of defendant's
expert as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff objected
to the photographs; the trial judge sustained the objection but
permitted the expert to use them for demonstrative purposes
during his testimony. The jury asked about the photos during
deliberations (indicating their importance) and the trial judge
told jurors that the photos were for purposes of demonstrating
testimony and were not admitted into evidence. The jury found
for the defendant, which led to appeal on the ground that the
trial court erred in permitting the use of "posed photographs
taken by one party to show the precise location of the parties at
impact." In rejecting this appeal, the Supreme Court rendered an
important decision on "posed photographs."
(I) Background: The plaintiff argued against use of the
photographs on the basis of a longstanding prohibition in
Kentucky law against the use of posed photographs. She
B-1
relied on the following cases that were described in the
opinion:
(a) Welch v. L.& N. R. Co., 173 S.W. 338 (Ky. 1912):
The plaintiff in this case was struck by a train near a
railroad track when two vehicles on the track collided.
The trial produced an important dispute about where she
stood at the time of the collision; she offered a posed
photograph showing precisely where she said she stood
at that moment. The supreme court held that the photos
were inadmissible; it struggled with its reasoning,
implied that the photos would be a hearsay statement by
the photographer, but seemed in the end to say that
posed photos are inadmissible because they are self-
serving.
(b) Tumey v. Richardson, 437 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1969):
The action here involved a collision of two vehicles,
one of which was moved by a wrecker before a police
officer could complete his investigation. The driver
of the wrecker, at the direction of the officer, moved
the vehicle back to the position he thought it had
before being moved and a "posed photograph" was taken
of the location of the vehicles. The trial court
admitted the photograph over objection and this became
an issue on appeal. The supreme court described the
applicable law as requiring exclusion of a posed
photograph but ruled in this instance that its
admission did not constitute an abuse of the trial
judge's discretion. The Court in Gorman conceded that
this case (especially in light of some others that
contradicted Welch and Tumey) left the law on posed
photographs unclear.
So, the Court undertook in Gorman to reappraise its position
on the admissibility of posed photographs.
(2) Rationale: The Court reconsidered its rationales for
exclusion of posed photographs ("self-serving," "hearsay,"
and others) and found them unsupported and unsupportable.
It paid particular attention to criticism of the notion that
such photographs should be excluded because of the danger
that witnesses might use them for purposes of distortion and
misrepresentation, conceding that such exclusion would be
equivalent to a trial judge ordering a witness from the
stand because he/she was believed to be lying. It noted the
great value of photographs ("a picture is worth a thousand
words") and concluded that there is no valid reason for
exclusion of such evidence and lots of reason for admitting
it--"photographs frequently communicate the testimony of a
witness to the jury more fully and accurately than the words
in the testimony do." 19 S.W.3d at 668.
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(3) Holding: "[W]e hold that the admissibility of a posed
photograph is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling will not be interfered with on
appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion."
(a) The Court noted that it is necessary, of course, to
authenticate such a photograph (i.e., "verified
testimonially as a fair and accurate portrayal of
[what] it is supposed to represent." (This would be
judged under KRE 901(a).)
(b) Such a photograph must be relevant under KRE 401;
"if the fact to be evidenced by the photograph is
itself not admissible, obviously it cannot be proved by
photographs, or otherwise."
(c) Finally, said the Court, the trial "must determine
that the photograph's probative value is not
'substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the
jury, ... or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. '" (This balancing occurs under KRE 403.)
(4) Additional Issues in Gorman v. Hunt: While the
treatment of the posed photographs issue is the most
important aspect of this case, it involved two other
evidence issues that are deserving of commentary:
(a) Bases of Expert Testimony: The defendant used an
expert witness to testify as to where the impact point
was between the plaintiff and defendant's vehicle. In
giving his opinion on this matter, the witness relied
"in large part" on a scuff mark in the highway which he
attributed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff objected to
this opinion because the expert witness lacked personal
knowledge of the location of this scuff mark; it seems
that he relied on the testimony of the police officer
who had investigated the accident as to the location of
this scuff mark.
(i) The Court used KRE 703 in rejecting
plaintiff's argument. This rule clearly allows
experts to rely on information made available to
them at trial (through the testimony of a
witness), which was the case with the police
officer's testimony.
(ii) The Court quoted the part of KRE 703 that
allows experts to rely on information not
admissible as evidence if "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in
B-3
forming opinions." It seemed to indicate that the
expert could have relied on this information under
this part of the rule even if it had not been
introduced as evidence.
(iii) Most authorities (federal and state) have
disallowed opinions by accident reconstructionists
based on information provided by participants or
bystanders (reasoning that this is not the type
that experts can reasonably rely upon in forming
opinions). Whether such authorities would treat
information from an investigating police officer
differently is at least open to question. Since
this part of Gorman is dictum, the Court should
have chance for further consideration of this
issue.
(b) Hearsay in Business Record: The plaintiff attempted
to introduce into evidence a "business record" to prove
that the defendant was driving above 50 mph at the time
of impact. The record was a report filed by a member
of the emergency squad that came to the scene to attend
to the injured plaintiff; the report contained an entry
saying that victim was struck by an auto traveling
above 50 mph "according to bystander." The Court held
the report inadmissible; the business record exception
requires a showing of personal knowledge by either the
maker of the record or the reporter of the information
in the record and that requirement was not met in this
instance. The Court could just as easily have ruled
the record inadmissible because the bystander had no
business duty to report the information in the record.
B. Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897 (Ky. 2000): The
defendant unintentionally killed a bystander when he fired a gun
during the course of a fistfight involving himself and two
others; the bystander was part of a crowd that was drawn to the
fistfight. In defending a charge of wanton murder, the defendant
claimed that he had fired the gun only to break up the fistfight
(suggesting that the victim had been accidentally, not wantonly,
killed). Two items of evidence came in for review on appeal:
(i) The prosecution introduced into evidence over objection
photographs of the crime scene showing the positions of
various witnesses (who gave testimony at trial), the three
combatants (including the defendant), the victim, and
various items of evidence; positions were shown by use of
spray painted marks and colored flags. The photographs had
been taken by police officers who had reconstructed the
scene (as of the time of the shooting) with the help of a
person who had been in attendance at the time of the crime;
they were introduced through the testimony of one of the two
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officers after he testified that the photographs fairly and
accurately depicted the reconstruction as it appeared when
photographed. .
(ii) The prosecution also introduced a computer generated
two-dimensional diagram of the crime scene and a computer
generated three-dimensional diagram of the crime scene. The
same officer was used to provide the foundation for these
items, who testified that the location of persons and items
on the diagrams were supplied to him by witnesses who had
been at the scene.
The Supreme Court found error in the admission of all of these
items and in the course of doing so, made interesting and helpful
points about admissibility of such evidence (especially the
computer generated graphics) .
(1) Photographs: The Court held that the photographs were
improperly admitted because they were used to show the
location of persons and items at the time of the shooting
and were introduced through the testimony of a witness (the
officer who took the photographs) who was not present at the
scene of crime and thus lacked personal knowledge of the
matters represented in the photographs. "His testimony to
that effect was based on hearsay."
(a) The Court went out of its way to make the point
that photographs (or diagrams) prepared in advance of
trial on the basis of hearsay provided to the maker of
the photograph or diagram is no reason to exclude the
item so long as the information represented in the
photograph or diagram is presented at trial through the
testimony of someone with personal knowledge.
(b) Had the prosecution used the witnesses who knew the
scene to authenticate the photographs as fair and
accurate representations of what they purported to show
(location of persons and places at the time of crime),
it would have been perfectly proper to admit them into
evidence as exhibits.
(2) Computer-Generated Graphics and Animations: The Court
noted the ever-growing tendency of lawyers to use this type
of evidence in litigation (in Kentucky and elsewhere), noted
that it had never addressed issues concerning admissibility
of such evidence, and undertook to make some observations on
the subject and to offer some guidance. The opinion is not
likely to be the Court's last word on the subject but it is
a beginning.
(a) Two Categories: The Court said that this evidence
can be grouped into two categories for purposes of
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analysis: "(1) demonstrative; and (2) substantive.
Demonstrative ... usually consists of still images or
animations which merely illustrates a witness's
testimony. Substantive ... uusually consists of
computer simulations or recreations, which are prepared
by experts and which are based on mathematical models
in order to recreate or reconstruct an incident or
event." 31 S.W.3d at 902. The Court then said that
the rules on admissibility depend upon the category in
which the computer generated evidence falls.
(b) Analogous to Photographs: The Court indicated that
its approach to admissibility of this evidence would be
much like its approach to introduction of photographs,
as explained in the pre-Rules case of Litton v.
Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1980). In Litton,
the Court addressed issues concerning the admissibility
of photographs taken by an automatic camera during a
burglary. In dealing with admissibility of this photo,
the Court noted the difference between the way it was
to be used and the way most photographs are used:
"Photographs are most commonly admitted into
evidence as demonstrative evidence on the theory
either that they are merely a graphic portrayal of
oral testimony or that a qualified witness adopts
the photograph as substitute for words ....
Photographs can be admitted as real evidence
in a proper case .... 597 S.W.2d at 618.
In the first situation (demonstrative), the photograph
is merely a pictorial representation of a witness's
testimony; in the second, the photograph is offered as
independent evidence (something other than testimony of
a witness). In Gosser, the Court suggested that this
distinction should be helpful in dealing with computer
generated diagrams and animations.
Footnote: It is not easy to imagine a computer
generated diagram or graphics comparable to the
photo in Litton (where the photograph stood as
evidence on its own, independent of a witness's
testimony). It is easy to imagine such evidence
being used for purposes of demonstrating matters
observed by witnesses and reported to the triers
of fact via the computer medium and it is easy to
imagine such evidence being used by an expert
witness in presenting testimony that reconstructs
an automobile accident or some similar occurrence.
(c) Gosser's Computer Generated Evidence: The diagrams
offered by the police in this case were demonstrative
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in their use (merely illustrative of the testimony of
witnesses). Before such evidence may be admitted, it
must be authenticated (under KRE 901); a witness must
testify that the computer generated evidence is a fair
and accurate representation of what it portrays (which
can only be done by one who has personal knowledge of
that information). It is not necessary to show how the
diagram was produced, how the information was put in
the computer, etc. Because the police officer who was
used as the authenticating witness lacked knowledge of
the contents of the diagram, they were inadmissible as
offered and should have been excluded.
C. Additional Observations About Computer Evidence: The
following observations are about the most frequently proffered
computer generated evidence:
(1) Computer Generated Business and Public Records: More
often than not, records offered into evidence under the
business and public records exceptions are likely to be
generated by computer. Two decades ago, when such records
were out-of-the ordinary, courts tended to impose special
authentication, best evidence, and hearsay constraints on
their use. Presently, truthworthiness of computer printouts
is presumed (because they are used in the ordinary course of
business) and such records are routinely admitted under the
hearsay exceptions for business and public records (upon a
showing of the requirements for these exceptions) .
(2) Charts, Graphs and Diagrams: Such items as these, that
once were drawn by hand, are commonly generated by computer
these days. If a witness having personal knowledge testifies
that such chart, graph, or diagram fairly and accurately
portrays a matter that is relevant to the litigation, the
item is admissible and should be admitted as an exhibit,
subject of course to exclusion under KRE 403 (which requires
a consideration of probative value against the danger of
undue prejudice, confusion of issues, etc.). The foundation
or authentication requirement is no different for computer
generated evidence of this type and non-computer generated
charts, graphs, and diagrams.
(3) Animations and Simulations: A computer generated
animation is merely a sequence of illustrations that creates
the illusion that the illustrated matters are in motion.
Once authenticated by knowledgeable witnesses as a fair-and-
accurate portrayal, they should be easily admissible for
illustrative purposes. A computer generated simulation is
based on a set of mathematical assumptions and is designed
to replicate physical events pertinent to the litigation;
reliability of the simulation depends upon the assumptions
containing all relevant elements and interactions in the
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events purported to be simulated.
(a) It is hard to imagine that the latter type of
computer generated evidence could be introduced other
than as part of expert testimony. Admissibility, of
course, would depend upon satisfaction of the Daubert
test that applies to all expert testimony. Reliability
would be the primary focus and could not be satisfied
unless all relevant external factors surrounding the
event were built into the animation or simulation.
(b) The animations and simulations may be accompanied
by prerecorded narrations, which would pose problems
under the hearsay rule and which leads to discussion of
the next case.
D. Fields v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 275 (Ky. 2000):
Police, while investigating a burglary, entered a residence
through an open window, found the defendant in the house with
jewelry and others items in his pocket, and found the body of the
female occupant of the house in her bed with a knife buried to
its hilt in her temple. The defendant was taken into custody and
charged with the murder after confessing to the killing at the
scene (so said the police officer). The officer then proceeded
immediately to reconstruct by videotape everything he did from
the entry into the house through the open window, to discovery of
the defendant in the house, to defendant's confession of the
killing, and to the body in the bed (ending the videotape with a
20 second shot of the victim's head with the knife visible in her
temple); the video reconstruction was filmed by a technician and
included a full contemporaneous narration by the police officer
of what was being filmed (in addition to the officer's report of
the defendant's confession). At trial, the prosecution played
the videotape for the jury during opening statement, replayed it
during the testimony of the police officer, and then replayed it
again during closing argument, all after the trial court had
rejected a defense motion in limine to exclude the videotape or
at least the narrative portion of it.
(1) Videotape Reconstruction of Crime Scene: The Supreme
Court held that there would have been no error in admission
of the video portion of the reconstruction (upon proper
authentication). It is just as admissible as a photograph
would have been; used as a pictorial representation of the
police officer's testimony at trial, there would have been
no difficulty in admission of the evidence.
(2) Audio Narration on the Videotape: The problem with this
part of the reconstruction was that it constituted out-of-
court statements being used to prove the truthfulness of
their contents (hearsay) and did not fall within any of the
long list of exceptions to the hearsay rule. It was, said
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the Court, nothing more than a prior consistent statement of
the witness (police officer), one that would not qualify for
admission under the Rules provision allowing such statements
to be admitted to rebut express or implied claims of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive even if it had
been so offered (which it wasn't) or under any other rule of
evidence law.
III. Privileges: While no landmark privileges decisions have
been rendered over the last couple of years, there are some that
deserve the attention of lawyers and judges.
A. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 2000): In this
double murder prosecution, the defendant sought access to
psychiatric records of one of the witnesses who testified against
him, wanting to examine the records to see if they contained any
information that would reflect on the witness's credibility; the
trial judge examined the records in camera, determined that they
contained no information that the defendant should have, and
denied him access to the records. The Supreme Court affirmed
this ruling in an opinion that expresses important positions on
the psychotherapist-patient privilege defined in KRE 507.
(1) The Privilege: KRE 507 creates a privilege (which
existed by statute before the Rules) for confidential
communications to a "psychotherapist" to obtain diagnosis or
treatment of mental conditions. The rule defines three
narrow situations in which the privilege is inapplicable
(involuntary hospitalization of the patient, court-ordered
examination of the patient, and where the patient's mental
condition is asserted as a claim or defense). As the Court
noted in Hodge, "there is no exception [in KRE 507]
applicable to a scenario where the patient is merely a
witness in a civil or criminal case." 17 S.W.3d at 844.
(2) "Qualified" Privileges: Some privileges are defined to
be absolute (invulnerable to claims of needs for evidence
except in specifically defined situations) while others are
said to be "qualified" (always subject to evidentiary needs
that outweigh the need for confidentiality). The lawyer-
client privilege is an absolute privilege; the work-product
privilege is qualified. Except for one, the privileges of
the Kentucky Rules of Evidence are defined to be absolute
privileges; the one exception is KRE 506's counselor-client
privilege, which explicitly provides that there is no such
privilege when the judge finds" [t]hat the need for the
information outweighs the interest protected by the
privilege." KRE 506(d) (2). As defined in KRE 507, the
patient-psychotherapist privilege is not qualified.
(3) Holding: In its opinion in Hodge, the Supreme Court
,construed the patient-psychotherapist privilege of KRE 507
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as a qualified privilege, "subject to a criminal defendant's
right to obtain exculpatory information ... and to confront
the witnesses against him." 17 S.W.3d at 844. Specifically,
it indicated that a defendant would be able to penetrate the
privilege to obtain information bearing on the credibility
of prosecuting witnesses.
(a) The Court seemed to base its construction of the
privilege on the constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant (i.e., the due process right to exculpatory
evidence in the hands of the prosecution and the right
of confrontation). This would suggest that the Court
might not so qualify the privilege in a civil case.
(b) The decision leaves completely open the interesting
question of whether other privileges in the Rules that
are absolute (lawyer-client, spousal privileges, etc.)
would have to give way to claims by a defendant in a
criminal case of a need for the privileged information
to impeach the credibility of witnesses.
(4) A Footnote: Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), is a
landmark federal case involving the patient-psychologist
privilege. It did not involve a a claim to privileged
information by a criminal defendant but did involve a claim
that the privilege should give way to need for evidence in
litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim on
the following ground:
"Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon
a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative
importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the
effectiveness of the privilege .... [I]f the purpose of
the privilege is to be served, the participants in the
confidential conversation 'must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions
will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is very little
better than no privilege at all. '" 518 U.S. 17-18.
B. Baney v. Yates, 40 S.W.3d 352 (Ky. 2000): After a
taxicab driven by Yates (an independent contractor) and owned by
Yellow Cab Company (who leased the cab to Yates) collided with
and killed a pedestrian, Haney (as administratrix of pedestrian's
estate) sued Yates and Yellow Cab for wrongful death. Soon after
the accident, Yates gave a written statement to Yellow Cab's
Safety Department about the accident. When plaintiff attempted
to discover this statement, the defendant Yates sought from the
Court of Appeals a writ of prohibition, arguing that the
statement was protected by the attorney-client privilege and thus
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beyond the scope of discovery. The Court of Appeals granted the
writ, relying on the pre-Rules case of Asbury v. Beerbower, 589
S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979). The Supreme Court reversed.
(1) Asbury: The plaintiff in this case sought discovery of a
statement made by an insured to his insurance adjuster after
an accident but before suit was filed and defense counsel
retained. The insurance policy required cooperation between
the insured and insurer, which caused the court to conclude
that this would give an insured reason to presume that the
statement was made for the dominant purpose of transmitting
it to an attorney for protection of the insured. The Court
held in this case that the lawyer-client privilege extended
to a confidential statement made by an insured to an insurer
for the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney.
(2) Holding: Relying on the fact that Yellow Cab was self-
insured, Yates argued that his communication with the self-
insured entity was analogous to a statement by an insurer to
an insured and thus should be protected under the attorney-
client privilege as construed in Asbury v. Beerbower. The
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that Yates had produced no
evidence showing a dominant purpose to communicate with an
attorney, that Yellow Cab was self-insured but was not an
insurer, and that Asbury would not be extended to the facts
of this case. In reaching its conclusions, as it has often
done, the Court reminded us that privileges should and will
be strictly construed to avoid a loss of relevant evidence.
(3) Footnote: In its opinion, the Court said it did not
need to decide whether Asbury survived adoption of KRE 503
but did comment that drafters of Kentucky's Rules had opined
that the holding in Asbury is consistent with the content of
the Rule. The language of the Rule seems convincing on this
point; KRE 503(b) (2) extends the privilege to communications
"between the client and a representative of the client" and
KRE 503(a) (2) defines representative of the client as "a
person having authority to obtain professional legal
services ... on behalf of the client."
c. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (Fed.
eire 2001): This case involves an issue about the lawyer-client
privilege that could constitute a trap for unwary practitioners.
Confidential communications between lawyer and client were
disclosed in this case to expert witnesses and were subsequently
sought by the opposing party during discovery proceedings.
(1) Disclosure to Third Persons: It is well-known that any
disclosure of privileged communications to persons outside
the relationship serves to waive the protection of the
privilege. It is also well-known that the involvement of
third persons necessary to the rendition of legal services
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(such as law clerks, paralegals, investigators) leaves the
confidentiality of the relationship intact. One might
believe that disclosure to experts is a part of the lawyer's
rendition of legal services and thus might remain protected.
(2) Not so says this and other federal cases. "[B]ecause
any disclosure to a testifying expert in connection with his
testimony assumes that privileged or protected material will
be made public ... , there is a waiver to the same extent as
with any other disclosure." 238 F.3d at 1375-76.
D. Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir.
2000): The lawyer-client privilege is designed to guard against
compelled disclosure of communications by a client to a lawyer.
In this case, the trial court used the lawyer-client privilege as
the basis for exclusion of communications by lawyer to a client,
raising the question of whether the privilege can be used to
shield against disclosure of information running from the lawyer
to the client. The Court stated the governing law in these
words:
" Although the attorney-client privilege generally
attaches only to statements made by the client, statements
made by the lawyer to the client will be protected in
circumstances where those communications rest on
confidential information obtained from the client ... or
where those communications would reveal the substance of a
confidential communication by the client .... 207 F.3d at
1019.
Kentucky's case law has never been crystal clear on this point
and the same is probably true of the language in KRE 503. The
latter is susceptible to an interpretation like the one set out
above, although it could have been stated more clearly. It
shields from forced disclosure "confidential communication made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services ... between the client ... and the client's
lawyer." While this probably looks to some like communications
running from the client to the lawyer (the normal situation), it
is at least arguable that the word "between" can-be construed to
cover communications running in both direction, an interpretation
that would clearly be more in line with the underlying objective
of facilitating the work of the lawyer by encouraging full and
unimpaired disclosure by the client to the lawyer.
IV . Miscellaneous:
A. Daubert Litigation: In the now-famous Daubert case, the
Supreme Court underscored the importance of a trial judge's role
in determining admissibility of expert testimony. It should be
remembered that the lawyers on one side of this case urged the
Court to limit the trial court's decision to one of determining
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relevance, arguing that a greater screening role for the trial
court would be "inimical to the search for truth." The Court
rejected this argument and found in Rule 702 clear recognition of
an important screening role for the trial judge, a role that the
Court characterized as a "gatekeeping" obligation. Almost from
the beginning, there has been intensive litigation in the federal
courts over the nature of this gatekeeping responsibility and
recently over whether the trial judge is obligated to conduct a
so-called "Daubert" hearing. The following is an indication of
where the case law may be headed in this regard, although the
final word is surely yet to be formulated:
(1) In Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir.
1999), after a trial court excluded expert testimony without
a hearing and granted a summary judgment, the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded for an in limine hearing. In an
earlier case, this Court had emphasized the importance of a
detailed factual record in these cases and of giving the
parties an opportunity to be heard on admissibility. In
this case, concerned with the process by which a trial court
must exercise its gatekeeping role under Daubert, the Court
"stressed the importance of in limine hearings under Rule
104(a) in making the reliability determinations required
under Rule 702 and Daubert." 186 F.3d at 417. In a more
recent opinion, this Court made the following statement on
the subject:
"[W]e [earlier] expressed our belief that an in
limine hearing is important ... because of the District
Court's 'independent responsibility for the proper
management of complex litigation,' and because the
plaintiff 'need[s] an opportunity to be heard' on the
critical issues of scientific reliability and
validity .... Moreover, an opportunity to demonstrate
the expert's 'good grounds' is particularly important
when the court's ruling on admissibility turns, in
large part, upon 'the factual dimensions of the expert
evidence.' We did not intend to suggest than an in
limine hearing is always required for Daubert
gatekeeping. Rather, we held that 'when the ruling on
admissibility turns on factual issues, ... failure to
hold [an in limine] hearing may be an abuse of
discretion." In re TMI Litigation, 199 F.3d 158, 159
(3d Cir. 1999).
(2) In Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2000),
the Sixth Circuit reviewed a trial court decision explicitly
refusing a request by the defendant for an in limine hearing
on the admissibility of plaintiff's expert testimony. The
Court said that" [d]istrict court judges must determine
whether an expert's testimony is both relevant and reliable
when ruling on its admission." 215 F.3d at 667. However,
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said the Court, "[t]he district court is not obligated to
hold a Daubert hearing .... " Id. In a slightly later case,
however, the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment that
had been granted after excluding expert testimony without a
Daubert hearing:
"Although we have explained that' [t]he district
court is not obligated to hold a Daubert hearing, '
a district court should not make a Daubert
determination when the record is not adequate to the
task ....
. .. A district court should not make a Daubert
ruling prematurely, but should only do so when the
record is complete enough to measure the proffered
testimony against the proper standards of reliability
and relevance .... With a more complete record before
the district court, Jahn will have an adequate
opportunity to defend the admissibility of her expert's
testimony, and Equine Services will have an adequate
opportunity to argue against it." Jahn v. Equine
Services, PSC, 233 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2000).
(3) In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), the United States Supreme Court engaged in some
discussion about the kinds of factors that trial court
judges should take into account in determining reliability
of non-scientific expert testimony (it being noted that
Daubert had provided four factors for consideration with
scientific testimony). In this discussion, the Court made
the following general statement about the process by which
the gatekeeping obligation is to be performed:
"The trial court must have the same kind of
latitude in deciding how to test an expert's
reliability, and to decide whether or when special
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate
reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or
not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable." 526
U.S. at 152.
Although the focus in Kumho was on the kind of factors that
ought to be taken into account in determining reliability,
some federal courts have relied upon this quotation to hold
that "the district court is not required to hold an actual
hearing to comply with Daubert." Nelson v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company, 243 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir. 2001). The
following statement may fairly well summarize the position
that seems now to prevail in the federal courts:
"It is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine how to perform its gatekeeping function under
Daubert . ... The most common method for fulfilling this
B -14
function is a Daubert hearing, although such a process
is not mandated .... The district judge may also satisfy
its gatekeeping role [without such a hearing] ... so
long as the court has sufficient evidence to perform
'the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand. '" Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grand Western
R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083/ 1087 (10th Cir. 2000).
(4) The Kentucky Supreme Court has not addressed the hearing
issue comprehensively but has rendered two decisions that
are pertinent to the discussion:
(a) In Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky.
1999) / the defendant argued on appeal against the
admissibility of expert testimony grounded in DNA
testing. He seemed to base his claim mostly on lack of
qualifications of the expert to render the evidence
admissible under Daubert; the trial court held a
hearing and after the hearing ruled the evidence
admissible. The Supreme Court made the following
statement in its opinion (while sustaining the trial
court's admission of the evidence) about preliminary
hearings concerning the admissibility of this kind of
evidence:
"We are persuaded by authoritative case law
from other jurisdictions that the reliability of
DNA comparison analysis using the RFLP and PCR
methods has been sufficiently established as to no
longer require a Daubert hearing ....
In view of the fact that this Court will no
longer require a pretrial Daubert hearing in every
case involving the admission of DNA evidence ... ,
to that extent, the decision in Mitchell is
overruled. 993 S.W.2d at 937.
It is not clear why the Court made this statement since
there was a preliminary hearing in Fugate relating to
admissibility under Daubert, although it may have
simply been a precursor to the case described below.
(b) In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky.
2000) / obviously in an effort to facilitate rulings on
the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court held
that "once an appropriate appellate court holds that
the Daubert test of reliability is satisfied, lower
courts can take judicial notice of the reliability and
validity of the scientific method, technique, and
theory at issue." 12 S.W.3d at 261. What the Court
seem to have headed off with this decision was the
necessity to determine in every case the reliability of
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such scientific methods as DNA testing, blood typings,
breathalyzer tests, fingerprinting, fiber and
ballistics analysis, etc. The decision is not broad
enough to resolve the broader issues of when a hearing
is required to perform the gatekeeping obligation
imposed on judges by Daubert.
B. Hearsay Tidbits: There are no recent hearsay landmark
cases to report. The following are worthy of note:
1. Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234 (Ky. 2001): The
decision in this case produced two hearsay rulings:
(a) Grand jury testimony may not be introduced against
a criminal defendant under the former testimony exception to
the hearsay rule since the defendant was not present at the
grand jury proceeding and thus had no opportunity to test
the evidence through cross-examination, the most fundamental
requirement of the exception.
(b) Under the declarations against interest exception,
at least in criminal cases and probably all cases, "each
statement within the broader narrative must be examined
individually to determine whether it is, in fact, self-
inculpatory. If not, it is inadmissible." 43 S.W.3d at
241.
2. Manning v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2000): The
hearsay in this case was an out-of-court statement by defendant's
common law wife to a police officer reporting that the defendant
had admitted to her that he had killed the victim (his father by
adoption). When called as a witness, the common law wife claimed
loss of recollection of both the statement made to her by the
accused and her statement to the police officer. The trial court
allowed the police officer to testify to what the common law wife
said about the defendant's admission.
(a) Loss of Recollection as Inconsistency: The Supreme
Court held the statement admissible as a prior inconsistent
statement by the witness. It embraced an earlier pre-Rules
decision by the Court of Appeals, Wise v. Commonwealth, 600
S.W.2d 470 (Ky.App. 1978), finding inconsistency in a loss
of recollection claim that seems under the circumstances to
be untrue--"reasoning that no person should have the power
to obstruct the truth-finding process of a trial and defeat
a prosecution by saying, 'I don't remember.'" 23 S. W. 3d at
613.
(b) Hearsay Within a Business Record: The defendant argued
on appeal that error had been committed when the trial judge
refused admission to a police report containing a statement
about the crime by an unidentified declarant. As the Court
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has often done recently, it held that the mere fact that a
statement is contained in a business or public record does
not make it admissible. Hearsay within a business or public
record may be admitted only if it is admissible under some
hearsay exception.
C. Preserving Errors and Other Procedural Matters: The
following decisions on procedural matters are.worthy of mention
if not discussion. Most are criminal cases but address matters
that are applicable in civil cases.
1. Turner v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 1999): The
defendant was charged with murder of his father, which he alleged
resulted from a beating of his father by some unknown assailant.
The victim had been beaten severely but was alive when taken to a
hospital emergency room. In response to questioning by a police
officer, the victim identified the defendant as his assailant
(limy son Joe") , an out-of-court statement offered into evidence
by the prosecution as a dying declaration. In a hearing on the
admissibility of the hearsay, as proof that the victim spoke
under consciousness of impending death (the pivotal requirement
for dying declarations), the prosecution called as witnesses on
this issue a nurse who was present when the statement was made
and a physician who was not present but had performed an autopsy
on the victim. The nurse expressed the opinion that the victim
knew he was dying when he made the statement and the physician
expressed the opinion that the victim (given the nature of his
injuries) must have known that his death was imminent. The trial
court found the statement admissible and defendant was convicted.
On appeal, he argued that the nurse was not qualified to express
the opinion she gave and that the physician's opinion was flawed
in that he failed to speak of "reasonable medical probability."
(a) Trial judges often have to decide facts to determine the
admissibility of evidence. Whether or not a declarant makes
a statement under consciousness of impending death is such a
fact. KRE 104(a) says that in making these determinations
the trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence law.
(b) KRE 104(a), said the Court in Turner, rendered the issue
concerning admissibility of the opinions unimportant, since
"a trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence in
ruling on admissibility of evidence. II 5 S.W.3d at 123.
2. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 5 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 1999): The
defendant was driving a police car under flashing light and siren
on a city street when he collided with another car and caused the
death of its driver; he was traveling between 90 and 100 mph at
the time of the collision. A key witness against the defendant
was the police officer who investigated the accident and filed a
police report. In his direct testimony, this witness described
the scene, the methods of his investigation, and the sequence of
events leading up to the collision; he said nothing about whether
the defendant or the other driver was at fault in the accident.
On cross-examination, defense counsel cross-examined the witness
about his police report and specially about whether he had not in
his report identified the other driver as the one "at fault;" no
objection was made to this questioning and the witness admitted
that he had so indicated on his report. On redirect examination,
the witness was asked if it was still his opinion that the other
driver was at fault, and over objection, answered that he now
believed that the defendant was at fault. The defendant sought
relief on appeal because of the admission of this opinion about
fault in the accident. The Commonwealth argued that the defense
had "opened the door" on this matter and thereby lost the right
to object to the inadmissible opinion. The Court of Appeals held
for the defendant but the Supreme Court reversed.
(a) "Opening the Door": The "opening the door" concept is a
kind of waiver of objections to inadmissible evidence; it
describes what happens when one party introduces improper
evidence and another undertakes to refute or contradict the
improper evidence with other improper evidence. It is well-
settled that the second line of evidence can be admitted on
the ground that the first line "opened the door."
(b) Need for Objection: There has long been disagreement
over whether to allow a party to rely on "opening the door"
when no objection was made to the evidence that is alleged
to have opened the door. The defendant in Alexander tried
to foreclose admission of the witness's opinion on fault (to
refute his earlier cross-examination) by arguing that the
prosecution had failed to object to the cross-examination.
The Court rejected the argument, saying "we are not aware of
any case law holding that a trial court loses discretion to
admit evidence to which the door has been opened merely
because no objection was made at the time the door was
opened." 5 S. W. 3 d at 106.
(c) A Footnote: There is a concept that is related to the
"opening the door" concept that is sometimes referred to as
the "invited error" concept. A party who asks questions of
witnesses (usually on cross-examination) will have no
grounds for objection to answers to those questions so long
as the answers are responsive to the questions. The Supreme
Court recognized this related concept in Mills v.
Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999): "'One who
asks questions which call for an answer has waived any
objection to the answer if it is responsive. '"
3. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.s. 753 (2000): Defense
counsel in this case made a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of the defendant's prior conviction for impeachment under Rule
609. The trial court denied the motion (indicating that the
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conviction would be admitted). In an apparent attempt to remove
the sting of the conviction if introduced by the prosecution on
cross, defense counsel elicited from the defendant on direct the
fact of the earlier conviction. The Supreme Court held that by
taking the initiative to introduce the conviction himself the
defendant lost his right to challenge admissibility of the
evidence on appeal. There is no comparable ruling under Kentucky
law but one should not be surprised if this position ultimately
makes its way into decisions of Kentucky courts.
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TO LIKELY CHANGES
by
Justice William S. Cooper
and
Professor Robert G. Lawson
I. Scope, Structure, and Interpretation of the Rules:
A. Introduction: The first cases to be discussed in this
presentation were selected because they have implications for law
practice under the Rules of Evidence that extend far beyond the
specific evidence rulings that brought them to the Supreme Court
for resolution. Because these implications are sometimes subtle
and hardly ever obvious, the broader importance of the decisions
can easily go unappreciated and for that reason are worthy of
some special attention by lawyers and judges.
B. Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997):
This case involved a prosecution for sodomy and sexual abuse of a
child who testified that the defendant Stringer subjected her to
acts of sexual contact and oral sodomy. A medical examination of
the child produced evidence that she had suffered "tearing in the
vaginal area as well as some stretching and partial destruction
of the hymen." To corroborate the child's version of events, the
prosecution was allowed to introduce testimony from a physician
that he had examined the child before trial and that his physical
findings were compatible with events reported by the child. The
defendant argued for reveral of his conviction on the ground that
the physician's testimony had been admitted in violation of the
prohibition against opinion testimony on the ultimate facts of a
case. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled the
testimony admissible. Stringer has important and far-reaching
implications for practice under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
1. The holding of Stringer is that an expert witness is not
barred from testifying to an opinion simply because that
opinion constitutes an ultimate fact for the jury. Without
regard to the broader implications described below, this was
a very important evidence ruling and a sound one. Kentucky
has had a long history of difficulty with the question of
whether or not to permit opinion on ultimate facts, first
saying no, then saying yes, and then saying no again. It
can be said that no one ever forumulated a good rationale
for blanket exclusion of opinion on this ground. Thus, it
is no surprise that by the time of Stringer, Kentucky may
well have been the only jurisdiction in the nation excluding
expert opinion solely because it involved the ultimate facts
of a case. The decision certainly did not plow new ground
in the world of evidence law but was an extremely important
modification of then-existing Kentucky law.
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Footnote: It should be noted that Stringer does not
hold that expert opinion on the ultimate facts of a
case is admissible, only that it is not inadmissible
solely because it involves facts which the jury will
ultimately have to decide. This is a distinction that
needs to be underscored.
2. Stringer is at least as important, however, for what it
says or implies about the comprehensiveness of the Rules of
Evidence, the significance of the pre-Rules case law on
evidence, and the power of the Supreme Court to add to the
law of evidence other than through formal amendment to the
Rules of Evidence. The situation that confronted the Court
in this case brought some if not all of these fundamental
issues to the forefront. Before the adoption of the Rules,
Kentucky's common law included a prohibition against expert
opinion on ultimate facts. Drafters of the Rules proposed a
rejection of this common law principle in favor of Federal
Rule 704 which provides that expert testimony is not subject
to objection because it embraces an ultimate issue. However,
this proposal was rejected (at the initiative of the Supreme
Court itself) and as they were adopted into law the Rules
were simply silent with respect to admission or exclusion of
expert opinion on ultimate facts.
a. The following statement captures the Court's ruling:
"Our failure to adopt proposed KRE 704 simply left the
'ultimate issue' unaddressed in the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence and, therefore, subject to common law
interpretations by proper application of the rules
pertaining to relevancy, KRE 401, and expert testimony,
KRE 702."
b. Two dissenters protested (in separate opinions) that
the Court had acted under the guise of interpretation
of the Evidence Rules and had in fact amended the Rules
in violation of the requirement that amendments by made
by joint action of the Supreme Court and General
Assembly.
3. What does Stringer mean?
a. Does this decision mean that the ,Court has a common
law authority to create evidence law outside the
confines of the Evidence Rules (i.e., through common
law precedent rather than formal amendment of the
Rules)?
i. Commentators on the Federal Rules have argued
over this question ever since adoption of the
Federal Rules. One view is that the Rules a,re
complete and preempt the field of evidence law;
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the other view is that courts must have authority
to deal with novel issues as they arise and that
the Rules are not impaired by exercise of such
authority.
ii. In some respects, the Rules seem to preempt
the field. KRE 402 seems to leave no room for
exclusionary rules of evidence unless found in the
Constitution, statutes, rules of court, or the
evidence rules. KRE 802 seems to. leave no room
for hearsay exceptions unless found in the Rules
of Evidence or other rules of court. .
iii. In other respects, the Rules seem not to
preempt the field. For example, they contain no
provisions on impeachment by bias or interest,
none on impeachment by contradiction on collateral
facts, etc. Also, it is arguable that the Rules
themselves contemplate expansion under the common
law tradition, for KRE 102 says that the rules
shall be construed "to secure ... promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained .... "
iv. Professor Lawson says that the Stringer
ruling is narrow and that it is "inconclusive"
with respect to the question of whether the
Supreme Court can expand upon the Rules by
judicial decision. Lawson, Interpretation of the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence--What Happened to the
Common Law?, 87 Ky.L.J. 517, 524 (1998-99).
C. Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6 (Ky. 2001): The
defendant was prosecuted for commission of sodomy and sexual
abuse for acts committed upon his biological daughter. At
trial, the alleged victim testified about various sexual
acts by the defendant upon her over a period of about six
years (fondling, oral sodomy, and sexual intercourse) i other
witnesses testified to observations tending to corroborate
the testimony of the child. The child had been taken to a
physician for a physical examination after the defendant's
arrest. This physician testified that the victim's pelvic
examination was normal and that she had an intact hymen
(neither of which rules out the possibility of sexual abuse
including intercourse) and that no treatment was rendered to
the child. More importantly, the physician was permitted to
testify that the child had given her a history of being
sexually abused over a period of years (but not the child's
identification of the defendant as the actor and not the
details of the sexual acts). The importance of Garrett (at
least for our discussion) is the Supreme Court's response to
the defense's argument that the physician's testimony about
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what the child said was admitted in violation of the hearsay
rule, an argument that required the Court's consideration of
the hearsay exception for statements made by patients to
physicians for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.
1. Introduction: The decision in Garrett is important
because of what it says about admissibility of hearsay
but also because of what it says about the structure
and interpretation of the Evidence Rules. It is
necessary in describing Garrett to delve into some
history concerning treatment of this kind of hearsay
under Kentucky law.
2. History:
a. Early Kentucky case law on this subject adopted
the traditional view that a physician who had been
consulted for treatment (a so-called "treating"
physician) could testify to case history related
by the patient but that a physician consulted for
the purpose of evaluation (so-called "testifying"
physician) could not testify to case history.
b. The Federal Rules, adopted in the 1970's,
eliminated this distinction and allowed testimony
about case history from both treating and
testifying physicians.
c. In 1990, two years before Kentucky adopted its
Evidence Rules, the Supreme Court decided Drumm v.
Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990). In this
case, the Court "purported" to follow the federal
rule but adopted what can only be described as a
middle ground between the early Kentucky law and
the federal rule; statements of case history to a
so-called "testifying physician" were presumably
admissible but could be excluded if prejudicial
effect outweighed probative value. Drumm seemed
to impose an exercise of caution on trial judges
by announcing that statements made by patients to
a "testifying" physician have "less inherent
reliability than evidence admitted under the
traditional common-law standard underlying the
physician treatment rule."
d. In 1992, Kentucky adopted KRE 803(4), which
carves from the hearsay rule an exception for
statements made for purposes of medical treatment
or diagnosis (including case history). It is
identical to the federal rule described above and
thus says nothing about the distinction between
"treating" and "testifying" physicians.
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e. The Supreme Court rendered several decisions
involving this problem between 1992 (the enactment
date of the Rules) and the arrival of Garrett for
decision. In these cases, the Court adhered to
the hybrid rule that had been adopted in Drumm.
See e.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449
(Ky. 1995) i Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1994).
3. Garrett's Hearsay Ruling: The Court held that the
"hybrid" rule of Drumm was inconsistent with KRE 803(4)
and that the decision in that case had not survived the
adoption of the Rules of Evidence. The consequences of
this decision may be summarized as follows:
a. In dealing with admissibility of statements
made to physicians, no distinction is to be made
between "treating" and "testifying" physicians.
KRE 803(4) requires inquiry as to whether such
statements were "made for the purposes of medical
treatment or diagnosis" and whether they are
"reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis."
b. Such statements, even when they satisfy the
requirements set out above, are subject to
exclusion under KRE 403 only if the trial judge
finds that probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
Under Drumm, the trial judge was obligated to
exclude such evidence upon a finding that
prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. The
Garrett balancing test is more clearly favorable
toward admission of the evidence than was the
Drumm test.
c. The parties argued in Garrett over.whether the
physician/witness was a treating or nontreating
physician. KRE 803(4) can be applied without
concern over this distinction. The Court did not
indicate one way or another as to whether KRE 403
can be applied without making this distinction.
One could argue that an assessment of "probative
value" (an element of the balancing test) cannot
be made without consideration of this factor.
d. The Court held that the trial court in Garrett
had not abused discretion in ruling the victim's
statements to the physician admissible.
f. Footnote: In the pre-Rules case of Big Sandy
Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d
526 (Ky. 1973), the Supreme Court held that a
C· 5
testifying physician (as opposed to a treating
physician) could not express an opinion about a
patient's condition if it was based on "case
history." The Garrett opinion makes note of this
earlier case but stops short of deciding whether
or not it survived adoption of KRE 702 and 703.
4. Broader Implications of Garrett: What Garrett says
about the structure and interpretation of the Rules is
at" least as important as its narrow hearsay ruling and
on this subject may be as significant as Stringer.
a. In considering whether the Drumm rule survived
adoption of the Evidence Rules, the Court focused
on the comprehensiveness of the Rules. It relied
on KRE 402, which requires admission of relevant
evidence unless there exists an applicable rule of
exclusion in a constitutional provision, statute,
Evidence Rule, or rule of court. It noted that
this fundamental provision leaves no room for an
exclusionary rule based on pre-existing case law.
i. Relying on the famous Daubert case, the
Court said that "when there is an adopted
Rule of Evidence that speaks to the contested
issue, the adopted Rule occupies the field
and supercedes the former common law
interpretation."
ii. By footnote, the Court noted that in
Stringer the Rules had not addressed the
issue in that case. The implication is that
in these situations there is no "occupation
of the field" and no structural hindrance to
gap-filling by judicial decision making in a
given case.
iii. In this opinion or in Stringer, the
Court mentioned several issues where there
are gaps in the Rules: admissibility of bias
evidence for impeachment, admissibility of
habit evidence, and whether eavesdroppers can
testify to otherwise privileged information.
b. With respect to interpretation of the Evidence
Rules, Garrett provides guidance on at least the
following matters (more subtle than explicit) :
i. On the question of how the Rules relate to
the pre-existing common law, the Court cites
and quotes an often-quoted statement that was
made first by the principal drafter of the
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Federal Rules: "Preexisting common law
remains only as a body of knowledge existing
'in the somewhat altered form as a source of
guidance .... '" At least some members of the
Court had not always adhered to this view.
See e.g., Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d
460 (Ky. 1997) (dissenting opinion) (using
pre-Rules case law to support admissibility
of hearsay not covered by hearsay exceptions
in the Rules) .
ii. Rule 1104 says that the commentary to the
Rules may be used in their interpretation
(meaning a commentary prepared by drafters to
explain the rules). When it adopted the
Rules, the Court acknowledged the existence
of this commentary but explicitly noted that
it had "neither adopted nor approved the
Commentary." In Garrett, the Court twice
relied on this commentary in construing and
applying the Rules, seeming to reflect an
increasing tendency to look to this source
for guidance. Because there has never been
an official publication of this commentary
(because of the Court's action upon adoption
of the Rules). Access to the commentary may
be more limited than it should be but there
are a couple of unofficial publications in
which the commentary can be found without
great difficulty.
iii. The Court said that Kentucky's Rules
were intended to conform to the Federal Rules
and quoted a statement from the commentary to
Kentucky's Rules that federal case law would
provide "invaluable assistance" in applying
the Kentucky Rules. It is thus unsurprising
that in Garrett alone, one finds reliance on
the language of the Federal Rules, Advisory
Committee Notes on those Rules, and decisions
of federal court construing the Rules.
II. Other Important or Notable Decisions Since Adoption of the
Rules:
A. Prater v. C.B.R., 954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997): In this
parental rights termination case, the C.H.R. was permitted at
trial to introduce (over objection) its own pre-trial case'report
(which included observations by social workers, statements by a
relative about physical and sexual abuse of the children,
findings of an examination of the children by a clinical social
worker, and medical records produced by an examining physician) .
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In an appeal of a termination order, the parents argued that
admission of the report violated the hearsay rule because the
report was a public record declared inadmissible by KRE 803(8),
while C.H.R. argued that it was a business record and was
admissible under KRE 803(6). In resolving this appeal, the
Supreme Court rendered one of its most important decision on
admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Rules. It also
offered some insights on how it would approach interpretation and
application of the Rules.
1. The Problem: The C.H.R. case report looks more like a
"public record" than a "business record" and would clearly
qualify as a "public record" under KRE 803(8), which defines
the hearsay exception for public records. However, this
provision explicitly removes from its coverage any public
record offered into evidence by the agency that prepared it
in any case in which the agency is a party. Because C.H.R.
prepared the report in Prater and was also a party to the
lawsuit, the report was clearly not admissible under KRE
803(8). KRE 803(6), the provision defining the business
records exception, contains no provision comparable to the
one that made it impossible to rely on the public records
exception. The question framed for the Court by the facts
and C.H.R. 's argument was whether a public record can be
admitted into evidence under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule.
2. The Ruling: The Court noted that the word "business" in
KRE 803(6) is broad enough to include a public agency, noted
that pre-Rules case law had used the business records
exception for public records, and held that the report in
question could be admitted into evidence under the business
records exception (provided it satisfies the requirements of
this exception). More generally, the Court makes the
important, if not crucial, point that the exceptions to the
hearsay rule operate independently of each other. In other
words, if a declaration against interest is not admissible
under the exception carrying this name (not satisfying some
requirement), it can be considered for admission under the
exception for excited utterances; if former testimony is not
admissible under the former testimony exception (because the
declarant is available), it can be considered for admission
under the exception for prior inconsistent statements.
3. Footnote: It should be noted that the record that
produced this important decision (favoring admission of
public records under the business records exception) was
ruled partially if not mostly inadmissible under the latter
exception. The problem with the case report from C.H.R. was
that it contained information provided by persons who were
not acting under a business duty; as everyone should know,
such information may not be admitted under the business
e-8
record and must be removed from an admissible business
record unless there exists some other hearsay exception to
render the information admissible.
B. Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998): The
defendant was alleged to have killed her husband by a lethal
injection of insulin. He was taken from his home in a state of
unconsciousness after defendant had called an emergency squad and
remained in a comatose state in a hospital for 10 days prior to
his death. During this hospitalization, blood samples were
collected from the victim on six occasions and sent to an
independent laboratory (which in turn sent it to another
laboratory) for analysis. His treating physician, and 2 other
physicians, diagnosed the victim's cause of death as hypoglycemia
due to external administration of a massive dose of insulin. The
state introduced evidence tending to show that the defendant had
motive, opportunity and animus to kill the victim and it
introduced records of the blood tests described above, which
supported the state's allegation that the victim had died from a
lethal injection of insulin. The defense objected to
introduction of these records; they were admitted into evidence
under the business records exception and, in addition, were used
by the expert witnesses as the basis for their opinions on cause
of death. The records were admitted without any preliminary
evidence as to who collected the blood samples, how they were
stored, how they got to the laboratories, or what methods were
used to test the samples (i.e., without proof of what was called
before the Evidence Rules "chain of custody"). Defendant
appealed his conviction on the ground that the blood test
evidence was inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction.
1. Chain of Custody: Kentucky's pre-Rules case law required
preliminary proof of "chain of custody" for tangible
evidence such as the blood samples in this case. The words
"chain of custody" are not found in the Evidence Rules. But
an obligation to provide a foundation for introduction of
real or demonstrative evidence (showing its integrity and
its relationship to the case) is contained in the language
of KRE 901(a): "The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims." The
old common law "chain of custody" requirement, said
Rabovsky, "is an integral part of the authentication [or
identification] requirement of KRE 901(a)."
2. Types of Evidence: Rabovsky recognizes that the
integrity of some real evidence can be shown without proof
of chain of custody ("weapons or similar items of physical
evidence, which are clearly identifiable and
distinguishable" by visual examination) and exempts such
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evidence from the chain of custody requirement. On the
other hand, because satisfactory integrity cannot be shown
in any other way, "a chain of custody is required for blood
samples and other specimens taken from a human body for the
purpose of analysis." "The purpose of requiring proof of
the chain of custody of a blood sample is to show that the
blood tested in the laboratory was the same blood drawn from
the victim."
3. Nature of the Requirement: Drawing on pre-Rules Kentucky
case law and federal case law, the Supreme Court said that
"it is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody
or to eliminate all possibility of tampering or
misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence
that "the reasonable probability is that the evidence has
not been altered in any material way." 973 S.W.2d at 9.
4. Ruling: The blood tests records in Rabovsky had been
admitted in the face of a "total failure of the Commonwealth
to establish a chain of custody of the blood samples." In
finding error, the Court quoted from one of its earlier
opinions: "We think that surely it is unnecessary to delve
into the literature of the law in order to document the
point that this type of carelessness in the development of
important evidence during the course of a trial simply will
not do." Henderson v. Commonweal th, 507 s. w. 2d 454, 461
(Ky. 1974).
c. Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1997): The
defendant was alleged to have killed a gas station attendant in
the course of robbery. He denied the charge and defended on
grounds of alibi (claiming that he had been with his wife at the
time of the killing). His wife offered no testimony at trial,
invoking her privilege not to testify against her spouse. The
prosecution introduced fourteen out-of-court statements that had
been made by the wife, most of which had allegedly occurred near
the time of the robbery and killing and many of which
contradicted the defendant's claim that he was with his wife when
the crimes were committed. Following his conviction, the
defendant argued (among other things) that the introduction of
his wife's out-of-court statements violated his spousal
privileges under KRE 504. The Supreme Court rendered several
important decisions concerning the privileges in responding to
this argument.
1. Background: KRE 504 creates (or recognizes) two separate
spousal priviliges. One is a "testimonial privilege,"
providing a witness-spouse the right to refuse testimony
against a spouse and a party-spouse the right to preclude
adverse testimony from the other spouse. The other is a
"marital communications privilege," providing a spouse the
right to preclude evidentiary use of confidential
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communications between spouses during marriage. In Estes v.
Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1987) (a pre-Rules case
construing a spousal privilege statute similar to KRE 504),
the Supreme Court held that a spouse's right to preclude
adverse testimony from a spouse also included a right to
preclude any and all out-of-court statements made by that
spouse and offered into evidence under hearsay exceptions.
2. Testimonial Privilege and Hearsay: The Court in Slaven
rejected the defendant's argument that KRE 504(a) extended
beyond spousal testimony to include spousal hearsay,
overruling Estes to the extent it held to the contrary.
This, said the Court, would "ignore the almost universal
rule that privileges should be strictly construed, because
they contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public
. .. has a right to every man's evidence.'" Slaven, 962
S.W.2d 853.
3. Marital Communications Privilege and Hearsay: The Court
added, however, that a spouse's privilege against disclosure
of confidential marital communications could operate to
exclude certain kinds of hearsay statements by the other
spouse. Kentucky law has for quite a long time construed
this spousal privilege to cover not only verbal
communications between spouses but also actions by spouses
in the presence of each other because of the confidentiality
expected in the marriage relationship; as stated in Slaven,
"anything done or said betweeri spouses in private was
considered confidential in the absence of evidence of a
contrary intention." 962 at 852. And since the protection
of a privilege cannot be lost through an unauthorized
voluntary disclosure by a third person, the marital
communication privilege could operate to exclude spousal
hearsay reporting activities that would qualify for
protection under the privilege. As stated by the Court in
Slaven, "we conclude that an out-of-court statement of a
witness who is precluded from testifying because of
invocation of the spousal privilege is admissible if that
statement falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule and if it does no~ divulge a confidential marital
communication."
D. Kentucky's "Daubert" Progeny: The Supreme Court has
embraced all of the essentials of the famous federal case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
1. Daubert rejected the general scientific acceptance test
for admissibility of expert testimony in favor of an
approach that requires the trial judge to determine if the
testimony is reliable (considering several non-exclusive
factors that are pertinent to reliability of such testimony)
and relevant to the issues of the case. The Kentucky
C -II
Supreme Court embraced this test in the case of Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995).
2. In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d
575 (Ky. 2000), the Supreme Court embraced a position taken
earlier in the federal courts (in the "Kumho Tire" case)
that the Daubert reliability test would apply to all types
of expert testimony and not merely to expert testimony about
scientific matters. In this same case, the Court made the
very important point that "Daubert" decisions would be
reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard--
"whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles."
3. In its most recent significant decision concerning this
area of the law, the Supreme Court addressed the important
question of whether or not trial courts must hold "Daubert"
hearings in all instances in which expert testimony is
offered into evidence. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d
258 (Ky. 2000). Obviously recognizing the enormous waste of
time and resources that would flow from a different ruling,
the Court held that "once an appropriate appellate court
holds that the Daubert test of reliability is satisfied,
lower courts can take judicial notice of the reliability and
validity of the scientific method, technique, and theory at
issue." 12 S.W.3d at 261. In situations of this type,
however, the Court said that judicial notice would serve
only to shift to the opponent of the evidence the burden to
prove that such evidence is no longer deemed scientifically
reliable.
III. Modifications Under Consideration:
A. Introduction: KRE 1102 requires for amendment of the
Evidence Rules joint action by the Supreme Court and General
Assembly. KRE 1103 creates an advisory committee on the Rules
called the Evidence Rules Review Commission. It is anticipated
that this body will regularly weigh the need to modify the Rules
of Evidence either at its own initiative or in response to
initiatives taken by others. The Commission membership includes
judges, lawyers, professors, and members of the General Assembly.
The Commission was inactive for nearly seven years but has been
meeting regularly for about a year and has under consideration a
number of proposals and recommendations for changing the Evidence
Rules.
B. KRE 412 (Rape and similar cases; admissibility of
victim's character and behavior.): This provision of the Rules
is commonly known as the "rape shield law." It prohibits the' use
of evidence of bad character (both general character and specific
acts of sexual behavior) of rape and other sexual crimes victims,
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subject to certain narrowly-defined exceptions; it is applicable
only in criminal prosecutions for specifically designated sexual
offenses (those defined in KRS Chapter 510, attempt or conspiracy
to commit such crimes, and incest). The provision was borrowed
mostly from the original version of the Federal Rules; initiative
for modifying the provision is attributable at least in part to
the fact that its federal counterpart has been modified in very
significant ways. The Evidence Rules Review Commission is
strongly leaning toward a recommendation that would make the
following changes in KRE 412:
1. The most significant change would expand the coverage of
the rule to all civil and criminal cases "involving alleged
sexual misconduct." As stated above, the rule currently
applies only in prosecution for sex crimes; the modified
rule would apply in all criminal cases and, perhaps more
importantly, in civil cases in which plaintiffs make claims
for damages for sexual assault or sexual harassment.
2. The current provision has three criminal case exceptions
to the shield against evidence of a victim's character: (i)
specific acts to prove that someone other than the accused
was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence,
(ii) specific acts between accused and victim to prove
consent, and (iii) other evidence directly pertaining to the
offense charged. Under these exceptions, however, the trial
judge is required to balance the probative value of the
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice and admit it
only if its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice.
a. The recommended modification would retain these
exceptions but would make a significant change in the
formula that ultimately determines admissibility of the
evidence.
b. The recommended modification (unlike the current
rule) would use the balancing test of KRE 403 for this
determination, meaning that the evidence would have to
be admitted unless the trial judge found that its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.
c.Upon careful comparison of the existing and proposed
rules, one can see that the modified rule is somewhat
more favorable toward admission under the exceptions
than is the current rule.
3. As indicated above, the most important change in the rule
is its expansion to civil litigation. With respect to this
expansion, the recommended modification provides no specific
exceptions to the exclusionary shield but authorizes a trial
judge to admit such evidence upon a finding that "probative
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value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any
victim and of unfair prejudice to any party." It should be
noted that this balancing test tilts more strongly against
admission than does the test that would be applicable under
the modification in criminal cases.
c. KRE 608 (Evidence of Character): The Commission has
under consideration a proposal to recommend substantial overhaul
of this current provision of the Rules. This rule is intended to
provide for the admission/exclusion of character evidence offered
for credibility purposes; however, it was butchered before being
enacted into law, has caused difficulty for lawyers and courts,
and has needed modification from the date of enactment of the
Rules.
1. Here is the way the current rule reads: "The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation, but subject to the limitation
that the evidence may refer only to general reputation in
the community."
a. It is easy to see the internal contradiction in the
provision, saying on the one hand that credibility may
be attacked by "opinion" but saying on the other hand
that it must refer "only to general reputation in the
community. "
b. The provision is actually more flawed in what it
fails to do. It does not deal with the longstanding
notion that rehabilitation must await impeachment, says
nothing about the use of specific acts to impeach, and
does not identify the type of character that may be
proved by reputation (i.e., "truth and veracity" versus
"character in general") .
2. The modification that the Commission has under review is
almost identical to a recommendation that had been made by
the original drafters of Kentucky's Rules (and that is very
similar to a provision that has worked well as part of the
Federal Rules). It reads as follows:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific
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instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609,
may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified. No specific
instance of conduct of a witness may be the subject of
inquiry under this provision unless the cross-examiner
has a factual basis for the subject matter of his
inquiry.
3. It is almost impossible to compare in any helpful way
this provision with the current KRE 608 (because of the
flaws of the latter). If one compares this with the law
that existed before adoption of the evidence rules, two
things would stand out:
a. The recommended modification would allow for the use
of personal opinion about character for credibility
(i.e., "I believe that the witness is a truthful [or
untruthful] person. II) , while the pre-Rules Kentucky law
confined this kind of testimony to general reputation
in the community (i.e., "I know the witness's
reputation in the community for truthfulness and it is
bad"). (It should be noted that the Rules of Evidence-
-KRE 40S--allow for opinion to be used when character
is offered for substantive use.)
b. Most importantly, the recommended modification would
allow impeachment by use of specific bad acts on cross
examination (i.e., "did you lie on the loan application
for the car?"). No such inquiry was allowed before the
Rules were adopted and none is allowed at the present
time (not so much because of KRE 608 but moreso because
Civil Rule 43.07 has been construed to prohibit such
impeachment). If the Evidence Rules Review Commission
ultimately decides to recommend this modification, it
would do no more than merely bring Kentucky law into
line with the Federal Rules and with the law of most if
not all other states.
D. Evidence of Other Crimes in Rape, Child Molestation, and
Civil Cases: The Commission has been urged to adopt for Kentucky
provisions that are comparable to Rules 413, 414, and 415 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. FRE 413 provides that in criminal cases involving sexual
assault crimes, the prosecution may introduce evidence of
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the defendant's commission on other occasions of sexual
assault. FRE 414 provides that in criminal cases involving
child molestation, the prosecution may introduce evidence of
the defendant's commission on other occasions of crimes of
child molestation. FRE 415 provides that in civil cases in
which damages are claimed for sexual assault or child
molestation, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of the
defendant's commission of sexual assault or child
molestation on other occasions.
2. Admissibility of evidence of this type, in both criminal
and civil cases, is determined under the provisions of KRE
404(b), which provides for the general exclusion of such
evidence while allowing it to be admitted if it has some
special connection to the case (i.e., to prove motive,
intent, absence of mistake, etc.). The shield provided by
this provision is designed to guard against the danger of
prejudice to the defendant that would almost surely follow
the introduction of evidence such as that covered by the
above-described federal rules.
3. FRE 413, 414, and 415 were enacted into law by Congress
over the objection of the Judicial Conference of the United
States (which is comprised of federal judges and lawyers who
practice in the federal courts) and the A.B.A. Criminal
Justice Section. The objection of these bodies resulted
from concerns over prejudice to defendants and from a belief
that KRE 404(b) provides a sound basis for dealing with the
admissibility of this kind of evidence.
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THE ABA ETHICS 2000 REPORT
The ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000
Commission) capped a four year study of the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(substantially adopted in Kentucky) with a report to the ABA, which was discussed at the August
2001 ABA meeting of the House of Delegates. The House worked its way through proposed Rule
1.10, and will resume consideration at the mid-year meeting. Once review is complete, the entire
document will be voted on, probably at the August 2002 convention.
My impressions of the Ethics 2000 project:
1) Ethics 2000 proposes reasonable solutions to four "hot-button" issues: the duty of
confidentiality (1.5), screening (1.10), the lying client (3.3), and the mis-addressed fax (4.4). At
the 2001 annual convention, the ABA rejected screening and modified the Ethics 2000 proposals
on confidentiality. The lying client and mis-addressed fax issues are yet to be discussed. There is
a useful addition to Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice) to attempt to define what an out-of-state
lawyer may do in a state in which the lawyer is not admitted.
2) The other proposed changes improve the language of the rules without, for the most part,
working substantive changes. Example: the proposal eliminates the confusing format of current
Rule 1.7 (Conflicts).
3) The comments are great -- much more complete than the comments to the present rules -- and
could serve as a text for folks who use the rules.
Following is a section by section analysis, with reference to Kentucky rules.
Rule 1.2. (scope of representation). Proposed comment [11] would restate the "noisy
withdrawal" requirement when a lawyer discovers that he has been assisting the client in criminal
or fraudulent activity. The lawyer must withdraw and,
"in some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the
lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document,
affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose
information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the
client's crime or fraud."
Rule 1.3: (diligence) Proposed comment [5] suggests that sole practitioners prepare a plan for
death or disability which designates another lawyer to review client files, notify clients, and
determine whether there is need for emergency action.
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Rule 1.5 (fees) - as proposed, the rule would have required that most fee arrangements be in
writing. By a vote of 129-108, the ABA House of Delegates inserted the word "preferably"
before ""in writing."
Proposed Comment [6] would make it clear that a contingent fee may be charged in a post-
judgment representation to collect child support or maintenance. (This is consistent with
Kentucky's version of Rule 1.5)
Rule 1.6 (confidentiality) - as proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission, Rule 1.6 would have
allowed (but not required) lawyers to reveal confidential information:
1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud seriously injurious to another's
interest in the course of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to another that has or will result from
the client's crime or fraud in the course of which the client used the lawyer's services.
4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with the rules
5) as necessary in matters of dispute between lawyer and client (not a change in 1.6)
The ABA House of Delegates adopted (1) and (4), rejected (2), and (3) was withdrawn.
Rule 1.7 (conflicts). The proposed rule is clearer than current Rule 1.7 and reads as follows:
!ill. Except as provided in paragraph Cb), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
ill the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client: or
ill there is a significant risk that the representation ofone or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client. a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
.au Notwithstanding the existence ofa concurrent conflict ofinterest under paragraph Ca),
a lawyer may represent a client if:
ill the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client:
ill the representation is not prohibited by law:
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ill the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal; and .
ill each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Note that the proposed rule requires written informed consent.
Proposed comment [22] deals with the interesting question of a consent to a future conflict. The
issue arises in cases in which the attorney wants to be free to represent Client A against Client B if
litigation arises. May the attorney obtain the informed consent of B in advance. Comment [22]
cautiously endorses such waivers by sophisticated clients.
Maya lawyer take conflicting legal positions -- for example, argue in case 1 for dram shop liability
and in case 2 against dram shop liability. Proposed comment [24] represents a substantial
improvement over the present comment.
[241 Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at
different times on behalfofdifferent clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf
of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in
an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if
there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision
favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf
of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk
include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal
relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term
interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If
there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients,
the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
Rule 1.8 (Specific Conflict Rules)
Subsection (c) would provide that a lawyer may not solicit a gift, including a testamentary gift, from
a client. The comments make it clear that this means a gift to the lawyer or to a relative of the lawyer.
The provision would not prevent the lawyer from accepting an unsolicited gift, though the comments
caution that such gifts might be considered the product of undue influence.
Subsection G) would prohibit sexual relations with a client unless the relationship existed when the
client -lawyer relationship was established. The ABA rejected several motions to delete this
provision, including one alleging it would be onerous for lawyers in small rural communities
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The proposed rules would delete the special rule (current 1.8(i)), which deals with the "lawyer-
spouses on opposite sides of the v" issue. The explanation is that the present rule is unnecessary --
that conflicts of this type are better analyzed under the general rule (1.7). Proposed Comment [11]
to Rule 1.7 would replace 1.8(i). That comment provides:
il1l When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially
related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client
confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty
and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence
and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the
representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse,
ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party,
unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family
relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers
are associated. See Rule 1.10.
Rule 1.9 (Former Clients)
No substantive changes are proposed. The proposed comments would further develop the meaning
of "substantially related" and would eliminate the comment which attempts to distinguish between
the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality (present Comment [10])
Rule 1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts)
The Ethics 2000 commission amendment to Rule 1.10 would allow a firm to "screen" an "infected"
lawyer joining the firm to avoid disqualifying the firm. Screening is allowed by Rules 1.11 and 1.12
(government lawyers and judges joining firms), and by Kentucky's version of 1.10 -- in 1999, the
Kentucky Supreme Court amended 1.10 to give the okay to screening as a way to avoid
disqualification.
The ABA House of Delegates rejected screening by a 176-130 vote.
Rule 1.11 (Government lawyers)
Proposed comment [5] appears to reject imputed disqualification when a lawyer moves from one
governmental agency to another (e.g. public defender to prosecutor).
Rule 1.12 (Judges)
The proposed rule would extend to arbitrators and mediators.
Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client)
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No substantive changes proposed
Rule 1.14 (Client under Disability)
No substantive changes proposed. The comments are more complete than the current comments.
Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping property)
No substantive changes proposed.
Rule 1.16 (Withdrawal)
No substantive changes proposed.
Rule 1.17 (Sale of Law Practice)
No substantive e changes.
Note -- The ABA added Rule 1.17 to the Model Rules in 1990. Kentucky did not adopt the rule..
Proposed Rule 1.18 (Duties to Prospective Client) - no corresponding rule.
The proposed rule would attempt to protect prospective clients' confidential information. It would
allow screening and consent by the prospective client to the use ofthe information. This is an attempt
to deal with the difficult issue of conflicts checks and follo)¥s an ABA ethics opinion on the matter.
Proposed Rule 2.1 (Advisor)
No substantive changes proposed
Proposed 2.2 (Intermediary)
The Commission recommends deletion of this provision and moving the discussion to Rule 1.7
(Conflicts).
Rule 2.3 (Attorney as Evaluator)
No substantive changes proposed
Rule 2.4 (Attorney as Third Party Neutral)
Increasingly, attorneys are hired to mediate disputes. This rule would require lawyers to inform the
parties that the lawyer is not representing them.
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Under the definition of "tribunal," lawyers in a mediation or non-binding arbitration would not have
the same special duty of candor required in proceedings before a court. Comment [5].
Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims)
The proposal would strike the provision in the current comment which characterizes actions taken
to harass or injure as "frivolous." This is consistent with the objective approach -- is there a basis
in law and fact for the position taken in the pleading?
Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation)
No substantive changes proposed.
Rule 3.3 (Candor toward the Tribunal)
The rule would attempt to deal with the difficulties presented by the language of the present rule,
which requires remedial action if the lawyer "has offered" false evidence. The recurring issue is
whether a lawyer can be said to have "offered" false evidence if the lawyer didn't elicit it - it was
volunteered by the witness. The proposed rule would require remedial action if the lawyer, the
lawyer's client or a witness called by the lawyer offers false evidence.
The definition of tribunal is any body which can issue a legal binding decision, which would include
administrative proceedings.
The proposed rule would also require lawyers to attempt to prevent their clients from engaging in
criminal or fraudulent conduct.
The proposed rule would allow lawyers to decline to present testimony reasonably believed to be
false. With respect to a defendant in a criminal case, however, the attorney must know the testimony
to be false before refusing the client the right to testify.
Note -- Unlike ABA Rule 3.3, the Kentucky version of the rule does not require a lawyer to tell the
court of adverse authority not disclosed by the opponent.
Rule 3.4 (Fairness to the opponent)
No change proposed.
Note - The Kentucky version of 3.4 differs from the ABA model in two particulars. Unlike ABA
3.4. our rule makes it unethical for a lawyer to threaten disciplinary or criminal charges solely to
obtain an advantage in a criminal or civil case. The ABA rule is silent on the matter.
Second, unlike the ABA, the Kentucky rule does not prohibit requesting witnesses not to speak to
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the other side. The ABA rule prohibits the practice unless the potential witness is a relative or
employee of the client and even then only if it's in the best interests of the potential witness not to
cooperate.
Rule 3.5 (Impartiality of the Tribunal)
The proposed rule would provide that a lawyer shall not communicate with a juror after verdict if
prohibited by law or court order (which seems unnecessary) or if the communication involves
coercion misrepresentation, etc. .
3.6 (Trial Publicity)
No change proposed.
Note - the Kentucky rule does not incorporate the changes made in ABA 3.6 after Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
Rule 3.7 (Lawyer as Witness)
No change proposed
Rule 3.8 (Duties of Prosecutor)
No substantive change proposed
Note -- the Kentucky version of 3.8 is somewhat narrower than ABA 3.8
Rule 3.9 (Layer appearing before the Legislature or an Administrative Agency)
No substantive change proposed.
Rule 4.1 (Truthfulness in Dealing with Others).t
No substantive change proposed.
Rule 4.2 (Communications with represented persons)
No substantive change proposed. Proposed note [6] would make a subtle change in the categories
of employees who are "off limits" in suits against represented organizations. No longer would mere
witnesses be off limits. The proposed note(showing additions and deletions) is as follows:'
IQl In the case ofan a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawycr
for arlothcr pcrson or cntity corlccrning thc mattcr in represerltation with persorlS havirlg a rnarlagerial
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responsibility on bellalf a constituent of the organization, and with any other persorl who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority
to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with
that the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes ofcivil or criminal liability or whose
statement rnay constitnte an admission orl the part of the organization. Consent of the organization's
lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If an agent or employee f!
constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent
by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes ofthis Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f).
In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rule 4.4,
Comment [21.
Rule 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Persons)
The proposed rule would add a sentence to the effect that a lawyers shall not give advice to an
unrepresented person (other than the advice to get a lawyer) if the unrepresented person and the
client's interests might conflict.
Rule 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons).
The proposed rule would attempt to deal with a "hot-button" issue that has been mooted at CLE
programs for years: the "misaddressed fax." The rule and notes would provide:
au A lawyer who receives a document and knows or reasonably should know that the document
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.
Commentary
[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of
the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third
persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods
of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships,
such as the client-lawyer relationship.
ill Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly
sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to' promptly notify the
sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to
take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope
of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived.
Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person.
For purposes of this Rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission
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subject to being read or put into readable form.
ill Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns
before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer
is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a
matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.
Rule 5.1 (Supervisory Responsibilities)
No substantive change proposed.
Rule 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer)
No change proposed.
Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants).
No substantive change proposed.
Note: - Kentucky has a very fine paralegal rule (SCR 3.700)
Rule 5.4 (Professional Independence)
No substantive change proposed.
Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice)
The proposed rule would attempt to deal with the interstate practice issue. Of particular note is the
subsection which would say that a lawyer does not engage in unauthorized practice if
the lawyer acts with respect to a matter that arises out of or is otherwise reasonably related to the
lawyer's representation of a client in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice:
The explanatory note to this subsection states:
ill Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) recognizes that the complexity of many matters requires that a lawyer
whose representation of a client consists primarily of conduct in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
is admitted to practice, also be permitted to act on the client's behalf in other jurisdictions in matters
arising out of or otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer's representation of the client. This
conduct may involve negotiations with private parties, as well as negotiations with government
officers or employees, and participation in alternative dispute-resolution procedures. This provision
also applies when a lawyer is conducting witness interviews or other activities in this jurisdiction
in preparation for a litigation or other proceeding that will occur in another jurisdiction where the
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lawyer is either admitted generally or expects to be admitted pro hac vice.
Rule 5.6 (Restrictions on the Right to Practice)
No substantive change.
Rule 5.7 (ABA rule regarding law-related services)
No change proposed.
Note -- Kentucky does not have this rule.
Rule 6.1 (Pro bono Service)
No change proposed. The ABA rule is more strongly worded than the Kentucky rule.
Rule 6.2 (Accepting appointments)
No change
Rule 6.3 (Membership in Legal Services Organizations)
No change.
Rule 6.4 (Law Reform Activities)
No change
Rule 6.5 - a new rule intended to encourage lawyers to provide short term representation to clients
in nonprofit programs. This is not a proposal for a general "lawyer-temp" rule.
Rule 7.1 (Communications about Lawyers' Services)
No substantive change, though the subsections are dropped into the comments.
Rule 7.2(Advertising)
Would specifically allow lawyers to pay the usual charges of a "qualified" lawyer referral service --
one that has been approved by the appropriate regulatory authority.
Note -- Kentucky's advertising rules are very different from ABA Rule 7.2.
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Rule 7.3 (Solicitation)
The proposed rule would allow lawyers to solicit other lawyers and close friends (in addition to
family members and former clients).
Rule 7.4 (Specialization)
No substantive change.
Rule 7.5 (Firm names)
No substantive change.
Rule 7.6 (Political Contributions)
No change. The ABA added this rule to the Model Rules in 2000; if adopted by the states it would
attempt to address the perceived problem of lawyers donating to candidates in order to obtain legal
business. Current ABA 7.6 provides as follows:
A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge
if the lawyer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the
purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or appointment.
Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission)
No change.
Rule 8.2 (Statements about judges and public officials)
No change.
Rule 8.3 (Reporting misconduct)
No substantive change proposed.
Note -- Kentucky does not require lawyers to report the misconduct of other lawyers.
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct)
No substantive change.
Rule 8.5 (Choice of Law)
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A. PURPOSE - TO COMMUNICATE AND PERSUADE
"The practice of admitting photographs and models in evidence in all
proper cases should be encouraged. Such evidence usually clarifies
some issue, and gives the jury and the court a clearer comprehension of
the physical facts than can be obtained from the testimony of witnesses."
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky., 387, 92 S.W.2d 363 (1936).
B. EXHIBITS - REAL EVIDENCE
1. Rule of Admissibility: Exhibits, like any evidence, must be relevant
(KRE 401 and 402), not unduly prejudicial (KRE 403) and authentic
(KRE 901 and 902). And see Gorman v. Hunt, Ky., 19S.W.3d 662,669
(2000).
2. Introducing Exhibits at Trial:
(a) Exhibit is marked (preferably in advance);
(b) Witness identifies exhibit;
(c) Witness authenticates exhibit;
(d) Move Court for introduction;
(e) Publish to jury (?).
3. Pre-trial "admission" of Exhibits:
Most Courts issue a scheduling order which requires the parties to
identify and produce exhibits days or weeks before trial. Frequently,
the scheduling order provides that Exhibits not specifically objected
to will be admitted into evidence. Exhibits not objected to are then
generally admitted without foundation requirements.
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4. Methods of Authentication:
(a) Requests for Admission (CR 36)
-"including the genuineness of any document"
-copies of any such documents "shall be served with the
request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or
made available for inspection and copying."
5. Exhibits Go To The Jury Room
6. Rejected Exhibit - Offer of Proof:
If the Court sustains an objection to the exhibit, and it cannot be
introduced through another witness, then the exhibit should be
marked "tendered - not introduced," and placed in the record by
an offer of proof. See KRE 103(a)(2).
C. VISUAL AIDS - DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
1. A visual aid is not evidence. Visual aids are not "introduced" and
do not go to the jury room.
2. Demonstrative evidence is appropriate if it aids the jury's
understanding, or assists the witness' explanation.
3. Use of demonstrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court.
4. The visual aid, or a photograph of the visual aid, should be put in
the Court record for appeal purposes. See Meglemry v. Bruner, Ky.,
344 S.W.2d 808,809 (1961).
D. KENTUCKY CASE LAW: EXHIBITS and DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
1. Use at trial:
Voir dire
Writing amount of damages sought on blackboard during voir dire
is permitted. Eichstadt v, Underwood, Ky., 337 S.W.2d 684, 687
(1960).
Opening Statement
Showing object to jury during opening statement permissible - at
least where object is later introduced into evidence. Shelton v.
Comm., 280 Ky. 733, 134 S.W.2d 653, 659 (1939).
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Closing Argument
Showing object or reading from document in closing argument is
permissible - even where object or document not formally
introduced as an exhibit, so long as the object or document was
referred to or read from by a witness. Edwards v. Whitley City Sales,
Ky., 246 S.W.2d 1018, 1020 (1952); Jones v. Driver, 282 Ky. 82, 137
S.W.2d 729,731 (1940).
Using magnetized blackboards and toy automobiles during closing
argument to illustrate argument is permissible. Ramey v. Ruth, Ky.
376 S.W.2d 292, 294 (1964).
Playing brief portion of witnesses' videotaped trial testimony in
closing argument permitted. Owensboro Mercy Health System v.
Payne, Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 675, 678 (2000).
Court Record
In Meglemry v. Bruner, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 808, 809 (1961), the Court
discussed how the use of \\ charts, diagrams or sketches in the trial
to illustrate or demonstrate oral testimony is helpful to a better
understanding by the jury... ." The Court commented \\ on the
obvious difficulty of understanding the evidence (on appeal)
where such maps or drawings are not in the record."
2. Specific Issues.
Blackboard
Writing amount of damages sought on blackboard during voir dire
is permitted. Eichstadt v. Underwood, Ky., 337 S.W.2d 684, 687
(1960).
Using magnetized blackboards and toy automobiles during closing
argument to illustrate argument is permissible. Ramey v. Ruth, Ky.
376 S.W.2d 292, 294 (1964).
Court recognized "the common practice of admitting free
sketches on a blackboard." Severance v. Sohan, Ky., 347 S.W.2d
498, 502 (1961). And see Meglemry v. Bruner, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 808
(1961 ).
Bodv Part
Jury's view of plaintiff's scar permissible. Wheeler v. Helterbrand,
Ky., 358 S.W.2d 501, 502 (1962).
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Books
If book qualifies as a learned treatise, the book or the relevant
portions may be read into evidence, but may not be introduced as
an exhibit. KRE 803(18).
Computer Generated Visual Evidence (CGVE>
May be demonstrative or substantive. Gosser v. Comm., 31 S.W.3d
897, 901-903 (2000).
Deposition
Generally not allowed as an exhibit. Wright v. Premier Elkhorn Coal
Co., Ky. App., 16 S.W.3d 570 (1999).
Drawings
Court recognized "the common practice of admitting free
sketches on a blackboard." Severance v. Sohan, Ky., 347 S.W.2d
498, 502 (1961). And see Meglemry v. Bruner, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 808
(1961).
Exemplar Parts or Products
Model wheel assembly properly admitted into evidence as it was a
true replica and useful to aid the jury. Hogan v. Cooke Pontiac, Ky.,
346 S.W.2d 529, 532 (1961).
Prejudicial error· for trial court to disallow model (exact facsimile of
steps on train platform) as real evidence. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.
Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky. 387, 92 S.W.2d 363, 366 (1936).
Experiments
Where allegedly defective appliance was experimented upon and
results of experiments were introduced into evidence, fact that
appliance was not shown to be in substantially same condition as
at time of event at issue is not ground for objection when relative
conditions of appliance at times of test and accident were made
plain to jury. Current v. Columbia Gas of Ky., Ky., 383 S.W.2d 139
(1964). And see Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, Ky., 435 S.W.2d 765, 767
(1968) (Courtroom experiment with ladder).
Criteria for admissibility of experiment and evidence thereon are
whether such evidence tends to enlighten the jury and enable
them to consider more intelligently the issues of the case, or
whether the evidence afforded by experiment is more reliable or
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satisfactory than oral testimony. Lincoln Taxi Co. v. Rice, Ky., 251
S.W.2d 867 (1952). (Court held that evidence of police officer's
"experiment" concerning who had the "green light" was
improperly admitted.)
Witness' testimony regarding an out of court experiment in which
the circumference of the witness' head was measured, and
prosecutor's comment regarding this in closing argument was
found to be irrelevant and reversible error because there was no
evidence that the decedent's head was ever measured or similar
to the witness' head. Meredith v, Com., Ky., 959 S,W.2d 87, 92
(1998).
Expert Reports
Not admissible as an exhibit, Hearsay, even if expert testifies at trial.
Wright v. Premier Elkhorn Coal Co., Ky. App., 16 S.W.3d 570, 571
(1999).
Can't use notarized letter of non-testifying doctor to cross-examine
an expert. Hawkins v. Rosenbloom, Ky. App., 17 S.W.3d 116, 117
(1999).
Hospital Records
"It is now well settled that the medical record of a patient in a
hospital is admissible in evidence under the regular business entries
exception to the hearsay rule. II Baylis v. Lourdes Hasp., Inc" Ky., 805
S.W.2d 122, 123 (1991).
"Upon matters properly included therein, medical records are
entitled to the same dignity as other forms of evidence produced
at trial. II Baylis, ida
Admission of hospital chart is within court's discretion. Young v, J.B,
Hunt Transp., Inc., Ky., 781 S.W.2d 503 (1989).
Mere compliance with KRS 422.300 does make the record
admissible, if inadmissible for other reasons. Phipps v. Winkler, Ky.
App., 715 S.W.2d 893 (1986).
KRS 422.300. Use of photostatic copies of medical record.
KRS 422.305. Subpoena of (medical) records.
KRS 422.310. Personal attendance of custodian of hospital records,
when.
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KRS 422.320. Return of medical records to court clerk.
Learned Treatises
"If admitted, the statements (contained in published treatises, etc.)
may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. II
KRE 803(18)
Life Expectancy Table
Court may take judicial notice of life expectancy/mortality tables.
Morris v. Morris, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 243 (1956).
Admission of map into evidence was proper where engineer
testified that it "fairly and accurately represented the area in
question." Severance v. Sohan, Ky., 347 S.W.2d 498 (1961).
Models
Model wheel assembly properly admitted into evidence as it was a
true replica and useful to aid the jury. Hogan v. Cooke Pontiac, Ky.,
346 S.W.2d 529,532 (1961).
Prejudicial error for trial court to disallow model (exact facsimile of
steps on train platform) as real evidence. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.
Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky. 387, 92 S.W.2d 363, 366 (1936).
Motion Pictures/Video
Generally governed by the rules that relate to photographs.
Columbia Gas of Kentucky v. Tindall, Ky., 440 S.W.2d 785 (1969).
(Not reversible error for trial court to refuse showing of film).
In Reffitt v. Hajjar, Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 599, 606 (1994), a wrongful
death case, the Court held that it was proper to show the jury a
videotape depicting medical treatment received by plaintiff's
decedent for purposes of establishing pain and suffering. The Court
also held that video depicting still photographs of plaintiff's
decedent was proper, except for \\the coffin scene."
Video of Hospital walk-through, to show distance between two
points was admissible. Owensboro Mercy Health System v. Payne,
Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 675, 678 (2000).
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Playing brief portion of witnesses' videotaped trial testimony in
closing argument permitted. Owensboro Mercy Health System v.
Payne, Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 675, 678 (2000).
Photographs
"Must be relevant to some material issue and not be prejudicial
either by distortion or cumulative effect or grotesqueness. "
Robinette v. Comm. Dept. of Highways, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 78 (1964).
In Paducah Area Public Library v. Terry, Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 19
(1983), the Court held that post-accident photographs of the
plaintiff were probative to aid the jury \\in determining the extent of
the injuries and the degree of pain and suffering."
Trial court's refusal to allow introduction of photographs of
deceased to show pain and suffering upheld. Clark v. Hauck Mfg.
Co., Ky., 910 S.W.2d 247,253 (1995). Court stated there was \\ample
evidence as to pain and suffering presented to the jury through the
deposition testimony of (the treating physician and the medical
records.)"
Photographs of deceased child properly admitted. Reffitt v. Hajjar~
Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 599, 606 (1994).
Refusal to admit posed photographs shown to be exact and
precise reproductions of events is prejudicial error. Cincinnati~ N.O.
& T.P. Ry.Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky. 387, 92 S.W.2d 363 (1936).
"The mere fact that a photograph was taken at a time different
from the date of the incident in question does not render it
inadmissible if it can be established as a substantial representation
of the conditions as they then existed." Turpin· v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 352 S.W.2d 66,67 (1961).
Fact that photograph is more effective than 'oral description, and
to that extent calculated to excite passion and prejudice, does
not, standing alone, render it in admissible. City of Louisville v.
Yeager, Ky., 489 S.W.2d 819 (1973).
\\ Merely because photographs are gruesome or revolting, they
should not be inherently excluded." Clark v. Hauck Mfg. Co., Ky.
910 S.W.2d 247, 253 (1995).
Photographs of partial reconstruction of scene of accident are
admissible where testimony is given to authenticate them as fair
and accurate representations, and some variance in testimony as
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to precise distance between objects goes to weight, not
admissibility. Tumey v. Richardson, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 201 (1969).
The admissibility of photographs is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Tumey, supra, at 205.
Posed photographs are treated as any other photographs. See
Gorman v. Hunt, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 661, 668 (2000).
Requirements for Admissibility: (1) authentic, Le., a fair and
accurate representation of what the photo purports to depict; (2)
relevant; and, (3) its probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by danger of undue prejudice. Gorman v. Hunt, Ky., 19
S.W.3d 662, 669 (2000).
Crime scene reconstruction photographs must be authenticated
by a witness having personal knowledge of the subject matter
before being admitted into evidence (and trial court erred in
admitting the unauthenticated photos). Gosser v, Com" Ky., 31
S.W.3d 897, 901 (2000).
Standards
"'Guidelines for Standards of Care and Management Standards in
the Post Anesthesia Care Unit,' published by the American Society
of Post Anesthesia Nurses" was a helpful guide for measuring the
appropriate standard of care and was properly admitted as an
exhibit. Davenport v, Ephraim McDowell Mem, Hosp., Ky. App., 769
S.W.2d 56, 61 (1989). And see Owensboro Mercy Health System v,
Payne, Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 675, 679 (2000).
Summaries
"The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation." KRE
1006. Rule 1006 requires "timely written notice" of a party's
intention to use a summary, and that the underlying documents be
made available to the other parties.
Where a fact can be ascertained only by the inspection of
numerous documents made up of many detailed statements, a
summary of those documents is admissible if prepared and offered
by a competent witness who has examined the documents and
summarized the results. Municipal Paving Co. v. Farmer, Ky., 255
S.W.2d 618, 620 (1953).
For a summary to be admissible, documents upon which the
summary is based must be made accessible to the opposing party
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in order that correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-
examination. Municipal Paving Co., supra.
Summary of nurse's recovery room experience properly made an
exhibit. Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. Hosp., Ky. App., 769
S.W.2d 56, 62 (1989).
It was improper to admit as an exhibit a summary of a witness'
testimony prepared by defense counsel during cross-examination
of plaintiff's expert which accentuated defendant's theory of the
case. The Court stated: \\A trial attorney's handwritten notes of
selected portions of a witness' testimony are shrouded in a slanted
subjectivity, regardless of the witness' authentication.... The harm
of allowing counsel's notes to be taken into the jury room is
worsened by the fact that when it is the court's imprimatur
stamped upon the notes there is a high likelihood that a jury will be
unduly impressed with an inordinate perception of their
significance. Counsel should withhold summary of the evidence
until closing argument." Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem,
Hosp" Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 61 (1989).
Video
See \\ Motion pictures."
X-Rays
Generally must be authenticated by physician with knowledge of
the injury. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Saunders, 229 Ky. 284, 17
S.W.2d 233 (1929); Armstrong v, McGuire, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 902 (1958)
(X-ray photograph was competent proof).
3. Other Legal Sources
-Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, Chapter 11
(1993).
-Osborne, Trial Handbook for Kentucky Lawyers, Chapter 31 (1992).
E. JURY VIEW OF SCENE
1. KRS 29A.31 0(3) provides:
When necessary the judge may authorize the jury to view the real
property which is the subject of the litigation, or the place in which
any material fact occurred, or the place in which the offense is
charged to have been committed.
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2. Purpose of view:
In this state, that purpose is to enable the jurors better to
understand and weigh the evidence adduced in the courtroom.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Farra, Ky., 338 S.W.2d 696
(1960). What is observed by the jury in the course of the view is not
evidence. Pierson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 350 S.W.2d 487 (1961).
And see Comm., Dept. of Highways v. Hackworth, Ky., 400 S.W.2d
217, 220 (1966).
The site viewed by the jury should have been helpful in determining
how the accident occurred or might have occurred, and the
probable benefits to the jury would substantially outweigh any
potential prejudice to (plaintiff) in this case. Thomas v. Surf Pools,
Inc., Ky. App., 602 S.W.2d 437 (1980).
3. Trial Court's discretion:
Site view within discretion of the trial court. Illinois Basin Oil Ass'n. v.
Lynn, Ky., 425 S.W.2d 555 (1968).
But see, Nash v. Searcy, 75 S.W.2d 1052, 256 Ky. 234 (1934), which
held that the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting jury to
view allegedly dangerous stairway.
F. EXHIBITS THROUGH PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
1. Deposition (CR 30)
"The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a
request made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production of
documents and tangible things at the taking of the deposition."
CR 30.02(5)
2. Interrogatory (CR 33)
Interrogatory No. : Please list and describe each and every
authoritative text or exhibit which the defendant intends to offer
into evidence at the trial of this case or intends to use or refer to at
any deposition in this case.
Interrogatory No. : Do you contend that defendant was not at
fault in causing or contributing to the motor vehicle collision as
alleged in the complaint? If so, identify each witness (name,
address and telephone number) and document which supports
this contention.
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Interrogatory No. : Do you contend that plaintiff was not injured
as alleged in the complaint? If so, identify each witness (name,
address and telephone number) and document which supports
this contention.
3. Request for Production (CR 34)
Request No. : Copies of any photographs, video tapes or any
other type of photographic representation which depicts the
plaintiffs or shows the nature or extent of the injuries to plaintiff.
Request No. All exhibits, models, photographs or other
documents or things by whatever name called, that the defendant
or its attorneys intend to rely upon to demonstrate and/or support
facts relevant to this lawsuit, whether in deposition or trial.
4. Request for Admission (CR 36)
May request other party to admit \\the genuineness of qny
documents described in the request. II CR 36.01 (1)
5. Pretrial Order (CR 16)
-watch out for Local Rules
-to exchange witness and exhibit list
-real (exhibits) vs. demonstrative (visual aids)
G. MOTION IN LIMINE
1. KRE 103(d) provides \\for a ruling in advance of trial on the
admission or exclusion of evidence. II
H. TRIAL TIPS
1. Have exhibits pre-marked.
2. Have trial schedule with a list of which exhibits are to be introduced
through each witness.
3. Any exhibit worth showing is worth enlarging (with exceptions).
4. For oversize exhibits, a reduced copy or a photograph of the
exhibit should be tendered to the Court so that it may be
transmitted with the record on appeal.
5. MORE IS NOT BETTER.
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I. EXAMPLES OF "LIABILITY" EXHIBITS
1. Collision diagram from police report
2. Photograph(s) of scene
3. Photograph(s) of vehicles
4. Defective product vs. safe product
5. Smoking gun documents
J. EXAMPLES OF "DAMAGE" EXHIBITS
1. Past Medical Expenses
-summary of bills (Exhibit 1)
-supporting bills
2. Future Medical Expenses
-itemized list
-life table
3. Wage Loss
-chart (Exhibit 2)
4. Permanent Impairment
-past earnings chart (Exhibit 3)
-W-2's
-tax returns (?)
-summary of economist report
5. Pain and Suffering
-medical records
-photographs
-medical illustrations
-x-rays
-positives of x-rays
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HOSPITALS:
MEDICAL EXPENSES
Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital
P.O. Box 620
Somerset, KY 42502-0620
3/20/99
thru
4/13/99
5/14/99
6/01/99
thru
6/08/99
2/03/00
$89,237.92
1,783.66
8,874.75
302.00
Cardinal Hill Rehabilitation Hospital 4/13/99 35,020.002050 Versailles Road
thru
Lexington, KY 40504 4/29/99
8/25/99 37.00
University of Kentucky Hospital 4/30/99 372.00P.O. Box 119
Lexington, KY 40588-0119
PHYSICIANS:
Melanio Medroso, M.D. 3/20/99 522.00Southeastern ER Physicians
P.O. Box 30188
Nashville, TN 37241
Amr O. EI-Naggar, M.D.
110 Hardin Lane, Ste. 1
Somerset, KY 42503
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3/20/99
3/21/99
4/02/99
100.00
200.00
150.00
EXHIBIT 1
MISCELLANEOUS:
Somerset-Pulaski Co. EMS
P.O. Box 3348
West Somerset, KY 42564-3348
Lifeline Home Healthcare
P.O. Box 938
Somerset, KY 42502
Laboratory Corp. of America
4500 Concern Drive
Louisville, KY 40213-1955
Burgess Drug No.2
U.S. Highway North
Whitley City, KY 42653 .
Rap-U-Save Plaza
P.O. Box 930
U-Save Plaza, Rt. 27
Whitley City, KY 42653-0930
(606) 376-3307
;; ~ , , :. ~
3/20/99
4/13/99
5/04/99
thru
5/13/99
5/06/99
5/10/99
6/08/99
7/08/99
8/11/99
9/10/99
348.00
458.00
646.55
161.25
10.17
15.22
14.59
75.46
22.98
14.98
23.98
78.69
78.76
22.98
22.98
23.98
Daugherty's Drug Store 9/23/99 65.00
P.O. Box 548
Pine Knot, KY 42653 10/13/99 9.00
5.10
11/03/99 10.00
65.00
11/11/99 9.00
5.10
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9/27/00 5.10
65.00
10/18/00 11.00
6.00
10/28/00 5.10
11.00
11/27/00 6.80
50.00
11.00
5.10
$147,098.35
PAST WAGE LOSS
(From Date of Injury Thru 12/31/95)
Average
No. Weekly Wage
Dates Wks. Wage Loss
5/11/92 33 x $682.13 = $22,510.29thru
12/31/92
1/01/93 52 x $682.13 = $35,470.76thru
12/31/93
1/01/94 52 x $628.13 = $35,470.76
thru
12/31/94
1/01/95 52 x $628.13 = $35,470.76thru
12/~1/95
TOTALS: $128,922.57
EXHIBIT 2
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10 Year Earnings Summary: 1982 - 1992
Employer Earnings
1982 South Kentucky RECC
925 N. Main Street
Somerset, KY 42501
$ 16,362.75
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
II
II
"
"
II
"
"
"
If
"
"
"
If
"
"
"
17,607.76
19,107.87
19,831.03
21,452.25
22,616.38
22,782.61
25,717.95
26,631.06
1991 South Kentucky RECC
Bluegrass .Electrical
P.O. Box 1526
Somerset, KY 42501
Shely Construction Co.
P.O. Box 12108
Lexington, KY 40580
11,402.64
5,859.00
74.00
i1
Perdue Power Line Canst. 5,046.00
P.O. Box 1564
Paintsville, KY 41240
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22,381.64
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VIEWS FROM THE BENCH:
A SURVEY OF CLERKS, JUDGES AND JUSTICES
PRIOR TO TRIAL:
1. READ THE ADVANCE SHEETS. ("It's embarrassing when a case in the
advance sheet is directly in point and the lawyer has not read it, but the opposing
lawyer has. I sl:lre hope my doctor isn't like that.")
2. NEVER TAKE A CASE WHEN:
~ A GROWN MAN COMES TO YOUR OFFICE WITH HIS MOTHER;
~ THE CLIENT SAYS HE WANTS A LAWYER WHO WILL DO
"WHATEVER IT TAKES" TO WIN;
~ THE CLIENT SAYS MONEY IS NO OBJECT -IT IS A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE;
~ THE CLIENT SAYS HE CAME TO YOU BECAUSE ALL OF THE OTHER
LAWYERS ARE "IN ON IT TOGETHER," OR ALL ARE CROOKED OR
INCOMPETENT, ETC.
3. MEET AND BE NICE TO THE GATEKEEPERS - CLERKS, BAILIFFS, AND
JUDGE'S STAFF. ("You be nice to the clerks. They will be nice to you." "Don't
[anger] the deputy clerks. If they like you, they can try to keep you in the good
graces of the judge(s); Food, especially fattening donuts are always accepted by
the clerks." "Show respect for clerks and deputies, they are trying to help you."
"Don't be afraid to tell the clerk you are a new attorney and will need help." "It's
the deputy clerks that really run the court system. Judges and circuit clerks think
they do but it 'isn't so.'" "Out-of-town attorneys can help themselves by assisting
the bench clerk with names and titles of co-counsel. Business cards still help!")
4. IDENTIFY YOURSELF TO THE COURT. ("There are so many new attorneys we
don't always remember their names.")
5. DO NOT MAIL IN WRONG DOLLAR AMOUNT TO FILE LAWSUIT.
("[Complaint] sits around the office until they send in balance.")
6. DO NOT REQUEST ENTIRE FILE FROM CLERK IF TWO OR THREE PAGES
WILL SUFFICE.
7. DO NOT NEEDLESSLY FAX COPIES OF MOTIONS TO BE HEARD. ("It is
double work to handle a faxed copy of a motion and receive the original via first
class mail the next day.")
8. KNOW THE LOCAL RULES AND PRACTICES. ("Most are reduced to writing
and are available - if [you] have a question, a simple phone call to the clerk could
save a lot of confusion." "[C]heck with local counsel as to not only local rules, but
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customs and practices before that particular judge." "[F]ully acquaint yourself and
staff (paralegals and runners) of the local practice on submission of motions and
orders ....")
9. HAVE RIGHT CASE NUMBER AND DIVISION ON YOUR FILINGS. ("This is
especially a problem when cases are consolidated.")
10. HAVE CORRECT NUMBER OF COPIES OF PLEADINGS; BE SURE TO SIGN
AND DATE PLEADINGS; BE PREPARED TO PAY FOR COPIES OR
CERTIFICATIONS, DO NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE THEM FREE. ("These fees
are set by the State and are not freebies.")
11. INCLUDE SELF-ADDRESSED STAMPED ENVELOPES FOR RETURNING
COPIES OF DOCUMENTS, ETC.
12. DO NOT ABUSE YOUR USE OF THE CLERK'S OR JUDGE'S OFFICE.
("Remember, the Clerk's office is NOT an extension of your office. We want to
help, however, we can not provide a workstation, typing service, phone, legal
assistance, advice, etc.")
13. NO DRIVE UP WINDOWS ON THE COURTHOUSE. ("It seems to me that
attorneys now believe every dispute they have justifies calling the court or just
dropping in for an on the spot resolution. Everything really can't be an
emergency. Perhaps that term needs some clarification for some folks.")
14. WATCH OTHER TRIALS AND ARGUMENTS. ("If you want to be a litigator,
come and watch other attorneys try cases. It is amazing what you can learn, both
good and bad, from watching others.... Don't limit yourself to how others in
your firm do something or some (compensated) know it all seminar instructor
who can't even find Kentucky on a map tells you.")
15. DO NOT SEND AN UNPREPARED ASSOCIATE TO COVER A MATTER. ("I'm
always amazed at the number of times an associate or other partner are sent to
cover a matter before and simply say - 'I know nothing about this file - just sent to
cover' motion or whatever.")
16. AFTER ANSWER FILED, INITIATE CONTACT WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL.
("Initiate contact ... within 30 days of the filing of the answer to plan a discovery
schedule for the case. Discuss 'holding' certain dates on your respective
calendars for depositions of the parties and contacting expert witnesses who
have busy schedules immediately to obtain a mutually agreeable date on their
calendars.")
17. IF LACK OF COOPERATION FROM OTHER SIDE IN DISCOVERY, MOVE
COURT FOR TRIAL DATE.
18. TALK TO OTHER SIDE BEFORE COMING TO COURT FOR A HEARING.
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("Don't use the scheduled hearing time to try and settle....negotiate in advance.")
19. IF CASE IS ACTIVE WITH NUMEROUS MOTIONS, OBTAIN HEARING TO
ADDRESS ALL PENDING MOTIONS. ("This concentrated approach is more
efficient for the Court and counsel than a continuing stream of appearances at
every other motion hour.")
20. NOTIFY COURT IMMEDIATELY IF CASE IS SETTLED. (The failure to notify
immediately of settlement "causes the Clerk a lot of unnecessary work" and
costs the state. "An order of settlement does not do it. A judge signs thousands
of orders and may not realize that an order settles a case sit for trial.")
21. WITHDRAW OFFER IN CRIMINAL CASE IF OFFER NOT ACCEPTED ON OR
BEFORE CERTAIN DATE.
22. KNOW CONTENTS OF PRETRIAL ORDERS, PARTICULARLY CUTOFFS
FOR DISCOVERY. ("Most motions to exclude witnesses or evidence are brought
about by sloppy practice and require the trial court to balance litigants need to
fully present their case vs. the other side's right to timely discovery." "Upon
receipt of [order], enter all dates on your [calendar] immediately. Compare those
dates to your discovery plan to ascertain that you can meet all deadlines without
resort to motions before the Court.")
23. COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE DEADLINES.
~ IF PROBLEM MEETING DEADLINE, DISCUSS FIRST WITH
OPPOSING COUNSEL.
~ FILE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN ADVANCE OF DEADLINE.
~ READ FRATZKE v. MURPHY, Ky., 12 S.W.3D 269 (1999). ("By omitting
[from her response to defendant's interrogatories] an amount for any
damage claim other than her medical expenses incurred to date, Fratzke
effectively stated that her claim for her unliquidated damages was nothing.
Thus, under [eR 8.01 (2)], Fratzke's claim for unliquidated damages at trial
could not exceed $0.00." Id. at 271).
24. SUMMARIES ARE EXTREMELY VALUABLE FOR THE TRIAL ATTORNEY,
AND WHILE KRE 1006 AUTHORIZES THE USE OF SUMMARIES, THE RULE
REQUIRES THAT TIMELY WRITTEN NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN OF THE
INTENTION TO USE A SUMMARY, PROOF OF WHICH SHALL BE FILED IN
THE RECORD.
25. KRS 422.300 - 330 (CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR MEDICAL CHARTS
AND RECORDS) ONLY APPLY TO HOSPITALS AND NOT A PHYSICIAN'S
OFFICER RECORDS. SEE, HOWEVER, KRE 902(11) FOR SELF-
AUTHENTICATION OF BUSINESS RECORDS ON THE CERTIFICATION OF
THE CUSTODIAN.
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26. A BRIEF SHOULD BE BRIEF; USE FOOTNOTES FOR RELATED POINTS.
("Lawyers should make every effort to keep their briefs as concise as possible.
It's a fact of life that judges have only a limited amount of reading time, and a
short brief is far more likely to be read fully. Lawyers should concentrate on
presenting concise arguments.")
27. AVOID EXCESSIVE ADVOCACY. ("Some briefs are so filled with advocacy that
the case as presented by one side and then the other is hardly identifiable as the
same case. Excessive advocacy in which the facts are slanted or distorted or the
law distorted or incomplete causes courts to distrust the advocate.")
28. CITE A CASE, STATUTE OR OTHER AUTHORITY FOR YOUR POSITION
WHEN ARGUING MOTIONS. ("Never assume the Judge knows the law or the
facts of the case. Always cite where you found the law and your interpretation of
the law." "Insisting to the judge that 'It's the law in Kentucky' or 'All the judges do
it this way' is simply not enough. Your presentation on the issue should be (1) ,
The law in Kentucky is set forth in ' (2) , Judge, I cannot find any Kentucky
precedent on this issue but in ' or (3) 'I have found no reported cases on
this particular issue but by analogy "')
29. PROVIDE COURT WITH COPIES OF CITED CASES (EXCEPT STEELVEST)
AND STATUTES.
30. HAVE ANSWERS FOR THE QUESTIONS THAT YOU KNOW WILL LIKELY BE
ASKED BY THE JUDGE. ("How much time do you need?" "How much bond can
your client make?" "Can your client pay the fine today?")
31. PROOFREAD ALL PREPARED EXHIBITS. ("A paralegal or secretary error is
ultimately a lawyer error and leaves a negative impression with the jury.")
32. PRE-MARK EXHIBITS. ("It saves a little time on each item and that can become
significant where there are many exhibits and/or it is a long trial.")
33. NOTIFY CLERK OR COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF EQUIPMENT NEEDS
BEFORE TRIAL.
34. ASK FOR JURY INFORMATION SHEETS BEFORE TRIAL.
35. KNOW YOUR WITNESSES. ("I feel that attorneys need to know their witnesses
better. By this I mean they should meet with all witnesses and get to know the
strengths and weaknesses of their testimony." "[I]nterview[] witnesses ... in
advance [of trial]. [T]his is more of a problem in District Court cases.")
36. VISIT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN JAIL. ("Often that is all that is required to
keep them happy.")
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37. BE PRESENT FOR JURY ORIENTATION. ("[I]t is important for [lawyers] to be
present on ... the day of jury orientation for the jury panel for that month so that
they can hear what the judge tells the jury about jury service, the trial process,
burdens of proof, etc.; and [they] therefore do not engage in a lot unnecessary
repetition when conducting voir dire or making opening statements, etc.... It
also gives the jury the impression that the lawyer is interested in the proceedings
and what the judge has to say and provides a good reference point when
conducting voir dire.")
AT TRIAL OR ORAL ARGUMENT:
38. GROOM AND DRESS APPROPRIATELY FOR COURT. ("Can't have the
plaintiff or defendant looking better than their attorney.")
39. DO NOT FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS OR TRIAL MEMORANDA THE MORNING
OF THE TRIAL. ("I detest holding hearings while juries wait to start the trial, and
generally will not give much attention to motions such as this." "We are not
speed readers, and would prefer to have [trial memoranda] at the pretrial, or at
least some reasonable time before the trial.")
40. BE ON TIME - BE ON TIME - BE ON TIME. ("I often wonder how some
attorneys ever fly anywhere. Do they hold the plane until they arrive?")
41. PREPARATION, PREPARATION, PREPARATION. ("It is so obvious and
sometimes embarrassing when one attorney is shooting from the hip versus the
attorney who is well prepared and knows the facts of the case and the law
supporting their argument." "As a judge, nothing is more distracting to either the
court or the jury than a lawyer who has no idea what he or she needs to prove
nor how to prove it properly." "The first order of business should be preparing
Jury Instructions as obviously their client's 'story' to the jury must fit within the
contest of the Jury Instructions. For me, the next step would be preparing the
opening statement---the story that counsel intends to tell the jury. With those two
critical outlines begin the detail work of figuring out exactly what witnesses are
needed & in what order so that the client's 'story' can be presented to the jury
through legally admissible evidence." )
42. TREAT WITNESSES WITH RESPECT AND BE CONSIDERATE OF THEM
AND THEIR TIME.
~ DO NOT LEAVE IN WITNESS ROOM WHILE YOU GO OFF TO LUNCH.
~ DO NOT LEAVE IN HALL DURING 4-DAY TRIAL.
~ DO SCHEDULE THEIR APPEARANCE IF POSSIBLE.
43. BE COURTEOUS AND POLITE TO THE COURT AND OPPOSING
ATTORNEY. ("Jurors like nice people and want to help them.")
44. BE CANDID WITH ,COURT, I.E., DO NOT ARGUE WHEN YOU HAVE NO
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ARGUMENT. ("Pick your battles. You can't be right 100% of the time, every time.
Know when to back off." "[C]ounsel should strive at all 'times to maintain
credibility with court. Beyond truthfulness, which is essential, it includes not
making frivolous arguments, and upholding the dignity of the judicial process.
Lawyers who have maintained their credibility are clearly much more effective in
their arguments and in their representation of their clients." "Don't represent to
the Court what your client tells you is the gospel. It will make a liar out of [you].")
45. ADDRESS ALL REMARKS AND ARGUMENTS TO THE COURT, NOT TO
OPPOSING COUNSEL. ("Do not argue with opposing counsel." "Avoid
inappropriate language or disparaging personal remarks toward other counsel,
parties or witnesses.")
46. ARGUE IN THOUGHTFUL, DIGNIFIED MANNER; DO NOT BECOME LOUD
OR EXCITED. ("Speak to be heard by the judge, jury, witness .... Resist the
temptation to speak when it is not necessary.")
47. DO NOT RIDE A HORSE TO DEATH - DO NOT RIDE A DEAD HORSE. ("One
juror observed while he understood the attorney had to stress his point, the
attorney had continued to the point that the jurors felt as if their intelligence was
being questioned. I am sure that is a fine line to walk." "If it is important, it needs
to be stated ONCE." "Pick the best witness to illicit a point of evidence and bring
it in through that person only." "[D]on't put on repetitive witness[es] stating the
same thing.")
48. DO NOT INTERRUPT OPPOSING COUNSEL AND NEVER EVER INTERRUPT
THE JUDGE. ("Judges and juries share a distaste for this practice.")
49. WHEN THE JUDGE INDICATES HE OR SHE HAS HEARD ENOUGH, STOP.
50. WHEN A JUDGE ASKS A QUESTION, ANSWER IT AS SUCCINCTLY AS
POSSIBLE. ("[I]f the judge asks a question, listen to and then answer THAT
question, with no 'spin' or 'evasion."')
51. WRITE IN A SIMPLE PLAIN STYLE AND AVOID DRAMATIC AGGRESSIVE
ARGUMENTS.
52. KEEP IT SIMPLE WITHOUT TALKING DOWN TO JURORS.
53. DO NOT ASK JURORS IF THEY WILL HOLD IT AGAINST YOU BECAUSE
YOU ARE NOT FROM THEIR COUNTY. ("Nothing will turn a jury off faster than
this question.")
54. AVOID REACTING TO RULINGS OR ARGUMENTS BY OTHER SIDE BY
"LOOKS OF DISBELIEF," "ROLLING OF EYES," "SNICKERING," ETC. ("I
find certain reactions by lawyers to rulings irritating and to some extent a lack of
respect. Lawyers should try not to react in such ways. At trial, the jury may not
like it. At a hearing, the judge may not like it." "Don't pout.... If a Judge makes a
ruling you disagree with do not get mad and pout. Make your record and take
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care of it on appeal." "The Judge won't rule to create a personal affront, so you
shouldn't create one either." "If you are the smartest lawyer in the courtroom
everyone will figure it out without you telling them." "Jurors are more comfortable
with attorneys who treat each other with civility.")
55. BE PROFESSIONAL AND COURTEOUS; DO NOT BE NASTY TO OPPOSING
COUNSEL OR THE COURT. ("[I]t gets an attorney nowhere to be nasty to
opposing counselor the court. As obvious as that may seem, it is sometimes
surprising how acerbic lawyers can be both in court and in writing." "Maintain an
appropriate sense of humor. It makes everyone's life a lot easier." "Just because
the other side is a jerk does not mean you are required to lower yourself to that
level." "[S]nide remarks aimed at insulting a witness, litigant or adversary ...
[are] counterproductive with me.")
56. OBJECT, OBJECT, OBJECT _. PRESERVE THE RECORD. ("Do insist that the
judge rule on your objection. It takes courage but you have to preserve your
record." Don't wait for a judge to look at you [before] you object.")
57. KNOW HOW TO USE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND DEPOSITIONS TO
IMPEACH. ("Most lawyers don't know how.")
58. DEPOSITION OF PARTY MAY BE USED BY ADVERSE PARTY FOR ANY
PURPOSE. (However, this does not include swatting the opposing lawyer on the
head with it.)
59. TENDER JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DISK IN ADDITION TO WRITTEN
INSTRUCTIONS.
60. DO NOT REFER TO JURORS BY THEIR FIRST NAMES. ("I know that some
attorneys consider this the first step in establishing some rapport with the jury.
However, I have discussed this with other court personnel and with past jurors
and the consensus is that that is a little too familiar in a jury trial .... To show
proper respect to jurors is essential to get them on your side and this small gaffe
at the outset of a trial should be avoided.")
61. DO NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, DIRECT ANY COMMENT TO A
JUROR EXCEPT DURING VOIR DIRE. ("Do not hand exhibits to jurors.")
62. DO NOT EMBARRASS A JUROR. ("I have heard attorneys ask the voir dire
panel 'Is there anyone on the panel who thinks it is against the law to drink and
drive?' ... [T]hese [type] questions place the juror in the position of having to
raise his or her hand to expose an ignorance of the law. It is always bad form to
embarrass a juror and that is what these type of questions do.")
63. AVOID FAMILIARITY WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL AND WITNESSES. ("The
use of first names for adults shall be avoided.")
64. REQUEST PERMISSION BEFORE APPROACHING BENCH OR WITNESS.
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65. CONTROL YOUR CLIENT AND WITNESSES. ("I wish that lawyers would inform
their client-litigants and 'their' witnesses not to ask if they can speak out in court
during arguments between lawyers or when they haven't been asked a
question.")
66. DO NOT USE REBUTTAL TO REPEAT EARLIER ARGUMENT.
67. REMEMBER: JURORS WATCH YOU, YOUR CLIENT AND YOUR
WITNESSES IN AND OUT OF THE COURTROOM. ("A woman with a back
injury does not wear high heels; no 'high fiving' outside the courtroom; proper
clothing.")
68. DO NOT THANK THE JUDGE FOR EACH RULING.
69. DO NOT FORGET TO STAND WHEN JURY/JUDGE ENTERS OR LEAVES
COURTROOM.
70. STAND WHEN ADDRESSING COURT OR EXAMINING A WITNESS.
71. DO NOT ASK THE COURT IN THE HEARING OF THE JURY TO DECLARE A
WITNESS AS AN "EXPERT."
72. KNOW THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. ("[S]et forth the standard of review in
[your] brief and emphasize it early during [the] oral argument."
73. DO NOT FUDGE ON BRIEF'S LENGTH. ("Tricks such as small type size and
numbering pages with "I, ii, iii, etc., are not appreciated.")
74. MAKE PROPER USE OF APPENDIX. ("Attach to the brief any orders, pleading,
exhibits, foreign cases, etc., that are important to your case if you want them to
be read. Don't bury the important items with extra documents just to increase
your poundage." "If a jury trial, always attach jury instructions.")
75. SET OUT RELEVANT STATUTE OR RULE FULLY. ("If you do not set out the
relevant statute or rule fully and your opponent does, the judge is more likely to
keep your opponent's brief before him or her when reviewing the matter or
listening to arguments.")
76. OBTAIN SECOND OPINION BEFORE APPEALING. ("While many counsel fear
losing a client, many clients would be better served if their trial counsel sought a
second opinion in preparing an appeal.")
77. STATE YOUR POSITION ON AN ISSUE BEFORE YOUR SUPPORTING
ARGUMENT.
78. AVOID EMOTIONAL JURY-TYPE ARGUMENTS TO JUDGES.
79. PRESERVE BENCH CONFERENCE. ("[W]hen it is your turn to voice your
objection, step closer to the bench microphone so that your words are ... picked
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up on the video recording.")
80. PRESERVE PRETRIAL AND POST TRIAL HEARINGS. ("[D]o not take for
granted that [all hearings] [are] being video taped.... To be on the safe side at
the beginning of your hearing, inform the Court you want [the] hearing
recorded.")
81. PHOTOGRAPH LARGE EXHIBITS. ("[B]y providing [photographs of introduced
exhibits], the Clerk when preparing the record will be able to put all your trial
exhibits with the appealed record. This will allow the appellate judges to get a
complete look at all the exhibits introduced at trial and make a complete
appellate record.")
82. CONDUCT EXHIBIT COUNT WITH CLERK AT END OF TRIAL. ("[B]e sure all
exhibits are in the clerk's possession and [the] record sheet of exhibits show
correctly what is introduced and what was just marked for identification.")
83. REVIEW APPELLATE RECORD WITH CLERK. (This allows the attorney "to be
sure everything is in the record.")
84. STATE BASIS FOR OBJECTION. ("[I]t would benefit the trial court and the
appellate court if the objection referred to a specific rule of evidence instead of
using general terms such as excited utterance, business record or whatever rule
the attorney is relying on for a favorable ruling." "Please object with specific
reasons instead of just saying, 'I object."')
85. DO NOT ASK A QUESTION WITHOUT A REASON. ("I was talking to several
judges and attorneys and one of the topics/complaints was the asking of a
question with no idea as to the reason for the question." "The lawyer who asks
questions simply to ask questions, with no idea as the reason for such questions,
demonstrates that she or he is not prepared.")
86. USE TIME LIMITS. ("I just completed a week long trial as special judge ... and
imposed strict time limits on the lawyers. Otherwise, the trial would still be going!
Time limits are a very practical tool in keeping trials on schedule.")
87. DO NOT LEAN ON THE BENCH; DO NOT LET YOUR CLIENTS LEAN ON
THE BENCH. ("It is not a leaning post.")
88. USE DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE. ("A picture is worth a thousand words; in
the courtroom it may be worth thousands of dollars." "When preparing for trial,
one of the first things a lawyer should consider is what demonstrative evidence
he or she can use to present the client's case. Jurors like photographs; so, invest
in a camera.")
89. HAVE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND LAWSON'S WITH YOU. ("You don't go
to Bible study without the Bible, and you shouldn't go to trial without Lawson's.")
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90. WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, READ THE RULES.
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